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Abstract
This thesis encompasses three essays around criminal behaviour with the first one
analysing the impact of programmes aimed at poverty reduction, the second one
developing a theoretical model of hysteresis in crime, and the third one empirically
investigating the hysteresis hypothesis in crime rates. In the first chapter I investigate
the impact of conditional cash transfers (CCT) on crime rates by analysing the
Brazilian Bolsa Familia, the largest CCT programme in the world, in a panel data
between 2001 and 2008. The related existing economic literature analysing general
welfare programmes usually ignores the crucial endogeneity involved in the
relationship between crime rates and social welfare policies through poverty, since
poorer regions are focused in the distribution of resources. I use the existing temporal
heterogeneity in the implementation of the programme across the states to identify the
causal impact of CCT programmes on poverty and criminality. The guidelines of the
Brazilian programme established that the amount of resources available for each state
should be based on the poverty levels in the 2000 Census. However, due to reasons
unrelated to poverty levels and crime rates, some states were able to implement the
programme to a greater extent more quickly than others. States that reached the level
of cash transfer expenditures proposed by the guidelines of the programme more
promptly had a more significant reduction in poverty rates. Similar but less robust
results are found for crime rates as robbery, theft and kidnapping, while no significant
effects were found for homicide and murder, indicating a weak or non-existent
relationship between conditional cash transfers and crime. I also develop, to my
knowledge, the first theoretical model to explicitly account for hysteresis - a situation
where positive exogenous variations in the relevant economic variables have a
different effect from negative variations - in both criminal behaviour and crime rates
in order to fill the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence
about the efficiency of policies in reducing crime rates. The majority of the
theoretical analyses predict a sharp decrease in crime rates when there are significant
improvements in the economic conditions or an increase in the probability of
punishment. However, the existing empirical studies have found lower than expected
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effects on crime rates from variations in variables related to those factors. One
important consequence of hysteresis is that the effect on an outcome variable from
positive exogenous variations in the determining variables has a different magnitude
from negative variations. For example, if hysteresis is present in the criminal
behaviour and part of the police force in a city are dismissed in a given year, resulting
in an escalation in crime, a reversal of the policy in the following year by readmitting
all sacked police officers in an attempt to restore the original crime levels will result
in lower crime rates, but higher than the original ones, yielding an asymmetric
relationship between police and crime. Hysteresis is considered in a simple
framework to model illicit behaviour. At the individual level, if criminal activity is
associated with intrinsic sunk costs and learning, then the cost of leaving a criminal
career is higher than entering it. At the aggregate level with homogeneous agents, this
is translated into a hysteresis effect that will only occur if a specific threshold is
surpassed. With heterogeneous agents, this phenomenon is reinforced generating a
hysteresis effect that exists for all possible values of the variable affecting the crime
decision. There are multiple equilibria at both levels. In the last chapter I empirically
investigate the existence of hysteresis in crime rates. To my knowledge, this is the
first empirical study to consider the existence of asymmetric effects on crime from
variations in the probability of punishment and in the opportunity cost of crime. More
specifically, I investigate whether positive variations on variables associated to those
factors, respectively police officers and average level of income, are statistically
different from negative variations. Using US crime data at the state level between
1977 and 2010, I find that police force size and real average income of unskilled
workers have asymmetric effects on most types of crimes. The absolute value of the
average impact of positive variations in those variables on property and violent crime
rates are statistically smaller than the absolute value of the average effect of negative
variations. These effects are robust under several specifications. A closer inspection
of the data reveals a relatively monotonic negative relationship between wages and
property crime rates, as well as negative variations in police and most crime rates.
However, the relationships between positive variations in law enforcement size and
most crime rates are non-linear. The magnitude of the observed asymmetries supports
the hypothesis of hysteresis in crime, and suggests that no theoretical or empirical
analysis would be complete without careful consideration of that important feature in
the relationships between crime, police and legal income. These results corroborate
the argument that policy makers should be more inclined to set pre-emptive policies
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Introduction
“...the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling gives frequent occasion to
forfeitures and other penalties which entirely ruin the smuggler; a person
who, though no doubt highly blamable for violating the laws of his country,
is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would
have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen had not the laws of his
country made that a crime which nature never meant to be so.”
- Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776.
Crime and Economics
Crime is much more pervasive in all societies than we initially realise, as the
word is often associated only with the more serious infractions. Most countries have
legislation which deems a myriad of acts and activities illegal, beyond the smaller
number of “natural crimes”, such as theft and murder. Smuggling, tax evasion, cartels,
illegal immigration, industrial pollution and copyright infringement are only a few
examples of acts that contravene the established societal norms and are classified as
crimes.
The classification of crimes is varied, but one important element of their taxonomy
regards the degree of damage the perpetrator causes to the victim or the society and
consequently, the severity of the punishment. People who are convicted of lesser and
petty crimes are usually punished with probation, community service or fines, rather
than a loss of freedom through imprisonment.1 Indeed, the penalties imposed to the
majority of crimes do not involve prison in most countries. The fraction of sentences
involving confinement in the UK and the US, for example, is approximately 5%.2
1The lexicon for the different levels of seriousness of crime varies, even across countries with
a shared language. In the English language, the legal term for serious, lesser and petty crimes
are respectively felony, misdemeanour and infraction in the US, and indictable, triable either
way and summary offence in the UK and Commonwealth countries.
2See Sentencing Statistics - UK Ministry of Justice and US Sentencing Commission.
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Criminality is not only a relevant social problem, but also an important economic
matter because it imposes a huge financial burden on society, as well as government.
In order to prevent crime, considerable amounts of resources are allocated to private
and public security. Another potential economic loss due to the presence of crime that
is more difficult to measure is the economic activity that emigrates or is undertaken in
another area or country because of high levels of crime. A cost which is even more
difficult to measure is that associated with violent crime which implies loss of life and
deep emotional harm to those involved.
Even though property crime is effectively a transfer of resources between agents,
a significant fraction of the subtracted goods are destroyed. This type of crime can
also have a harmful impact on incentives as it threatens the very principle of private
property. Even petty crime or diversions from social norms reduce the efficiency of the
economy: corruption and costly bureaucracy that is imposed to reduce illegal acts or
process those perpetrators who are already in the legal system for an infraction.
Due to the unquestionable relevance of crime, all social sciences make an effort
to contribute to the base of knowledge of criminal behaviour, which is enriched by
their different perspectives. Nevertheless the Economics of Crime, established by the
seminal article by Gary Becker published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1968,
stands out with two key contributions: 1) It is the only science that provides a formal
theoretical framework to criminal behaviour. 2) It provided some of the first empirical
studies on crime, and even though criminology emerged as a frequently quantitative
character and boasts an increasing quality of empirical analysis, economics remains
the leading social science at the forefront of quantitative methods. This is especially
true when one examines the relationship between crime and socioeconomic variables,
such as those examined in this manuscript, including income, poverty and welfare
benefits.
The economics of crime has almost entirely focused on serious crimes and for
that reason the theoretical models that followed have generally used prison as the
punishment of unlawful acts. That choice is certainly based on the relevance and
prominence of more serious crimes, but also frequently due to the greater tractability
of the models and the fact that virtually all empirical studies that use those models
as a framework analyse more serious crimes, like murder and theft, that are officially
registered and readily available. However, that focus may thwart the depiction of the
aspects of more general and common unlawful activities not involving jail, arguably
more economically motivated than the more serious crimes.
Certainly all violations of the social norms, in a broader definition, share key
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aspects from the economic perspective. Several decisions, from apparently
inoffensive cheating like illegal parking, on to drug use and cybercrime, all the way
up to capital crime share common elements: a decision between the benefits of a
certainty equivalent (no crime) and a lottery with the expected pecuniary and/or
nonpecuniary gain from the criminal act versus the associated probability of
punishment and penalty. As in any lottery, risk preferences play a relevant role in the
criminal decision. Additionally, two people facing exactly the same levels of expected
gain and probability and severity of punishment can make different decisions, and one
should also examine the moral cost and the opportunity cost of taking an action that
breaks the norms.
Nevertheless, because the punishment for more serious crimes involves jail, that
deeply affect the individual’s life and crucially his/hers knowledge about crime
technology, whereas lesser and petty crimes do not, theoretical and empirical analyses
should be careful about the distinction of crimes by the usual type of punishment.
The economic approach also allows one to examine the criminal choice from a
dynamic perspective as in the other mainstream economics models. Individuals would
calculate the expected present value of the net benefit of breaking the law. In that sense,
crime could also vary with the level of time preference rate. However, as Akerlof
(1991) highlights, any analysis that considers potential criminals evaluating all periods
in the future is based on an unreasonable assumption. The individual at the margin
would be likely, in most cases, to be very myopic.
Another potentially relevant economic variable to explain crime is unemployment,
which still is an open question in the empirical literature. Most studies examining
the relationship between labour market and crime have focused on this matter, even
though, until recently unemployment was not at the heart of the theoretical models in
economics of crime.3 Some studies find a positive relationship between unemployment
and crime, but many others find no significant or negative effects of unemployment
on crime.4 One explanation for that ambiguity is that are the flows, rather than the
levels of unemployment and nonparticipation in the labour market, that have a more
important effect on crime.5 The next step of this literature should focus at the analysis
of the transition intensities among employment/participation states, that would allow to
disentangle the impact of variations in the job finding and firing/quitting probabilities
3That was changed by Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003).
4Mustard (2010) provides an literature review on the empirical evidence on the impact of
labour markets on crime.
5As Shimer (2012) shows, there was a great variability of the sources of variation in




Serious crime rates are at lower level in the developed world than they were three
decades ago, but there are still important hurdles to be overcome by developing
countries regarding criminality. And less serious crimes permeates most aspects of
the socioeconomic life. For those reasons, a better understanding of the mechanisms
that drive criminal behaviour and crime rates is fundamentally important to the
implementation and efficacy of policies that seek to reduce crime in all its different
forms.
Overview
The three chapters that follow investigate important aspects of crime, providing a
contribution to the knowledge about the relationship between crime rates, poverty and
conditional cash transfers (CCT) in developing countries, as well as a theoretical and
empirical contribution to a better understanding of the phenomenon of hysteresis and
asymmetric effects in crime.
The first chapter contains, to my knowledge, the first analysis of the impact of
CCT programmes on crime, and solves the inherent problem of endogeneity in the
relationship between welfare programmes, poverty and crime rates by exploiting the
heterogeneous implementation of the Brazilian CCT programme. The guidelines of
the Brazilian programme established that the amount of resources available for each
state should be based on the poverty levels in the 2000 Census. However, by reasons
unrelated to poverty levels and crime rates, some states were able to implement the
programme to a greater extent more quickly than others. States that reached the level
of cash transfers expenditures proposed by the guidelines of the programme more
promptly had a more significant reduction in poverty rates. Similar, albeit less robust
results are found for the crime rate of robbery, theft and kidnapping, while no
significant effects were found for homicide and murder, indicating a weak or
non-existent relationship between conditional cash transfers and crime. It could be
argued that because individuals engaged in the criminal career have lower costs to
commit a crime, they are not affected by variations in their legal income and a CCT
programme would only influence the decision of individuals at the margin of the
threshold between crime and no crime.
In the second chapter, I develop, to my knowledge, the first theoretical model to
explicitly account for hysteresis in both criminal behaviour and crime rates. It also
provides a clear and simple transition from the individual decision to the aggregate
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crime rates, which constitutes a useful development in the theoretical crime literature,
as it allows to observe the relevant role of heterogeneity of individuals in the
composition of the crime rates. Intrinsic sunk costs and learning in criminal activity
generate hysteresis, and as a consequence, the effect on crime from positive
exogenous variations in variables such as law enforcement has a different magnitude
from negative variations. Because the sources of hysteresis are intrinsic to the
individual, they take effect even if the perpetrators are not caught and punished. If
hysteresis is present in the criminal behaviour, crime reduction policies will have a
diminished impact when compared to the expected impact where individuals with a
criminal past will behave similarly to individuals without a criminal past. Such
asymmetric effects will be very clear in a situation in which the crime reduction
policy in a given period is simply a reversal of a deterioration of one determinant of
crime. A concrete example would be a situation where part of the police officers in a
city are dismissed in a given year, resulting in a escalation in crime. If all sacked
police officers are readmitted in the following year in an attempt to restore the
original crime levels and hysteresis is present in the criminal behavior, that policy will
result in a lower crime rate, but higher than the original one.
This prediction is subsequently tested in the third chapter with the focus on the
asymmetric effects on crime from variations in police and income. Using US crime
data at the state level between 1977 and 2010, I find that two of the main factors that
affect crime - police force size6 and real average income of unskilled workers - have
asymmetric effects on most types of crimes. The absolute value of the average impact
of positive variations in those variables on property and violent crime rates, are
statistically smaller than the absolute value of the average effect of negative variations.
A closer inspection with a semiparametric estimation reveals that the slopes are
positive only for lower levels of police officers and they are negative for higher levels,
except to murder, but the slopes are still significantly larger in absolute value when
compared to negative variations in police, respectively to each type of crime. As will
be discussed, no theoretical or empirical analysis would be complete without careful
consideration of the various aspects raised in the following chapters. These results are
relevant for any empirical analysis of policies at crime reduction, but they are
particularly important for evaluations of policies based on increases of police force
size.
6After correcting for endogeneity, as it will be discussed in chapter 3.
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Chapter 1
Can Conditional Cash Transfers Reduce
Poverty and Crime? Evidence from Brazil
1.1 Introduction
Crime is a central theme in the discussions of the main public issues of
developing countries. Many of these countries have recently implemented policies
based on conditional behaviour that are aimed at vulnerable people: Conditional Cash
Transfers (CCT) Programmes, where the recipients receive a monthly benefit that
represents a significant increase in their initial income. These policies have been the
main device used by governments of countries such as Brazil (Bolsa Famı́lia), Mexico
(Oportunidades) and Chile (Chile Solidário) to reduce poverty.1 It is a stylised fact
that higher levels of income inequality and poverty are associated with increased
criminal behaviour, and these welfare programmes are deemed to be effective to
mitigate these social problems.2 A natural question would be whether those policies
have also affected crime rate levels and how effective this kind of policy is when
compared to increases in law enforcement.
This chapter uses a panel data set to analyse the impact of CCT programmes on
crime rates in the Brazilian states, a relationship that still has not been investigated by
formal theoretical or empirical analyses. As the vast majority of the empirical literature
in economics of crime, the present analysis is focused on more serious crimes, since
1Other countries that adopted CCT programmes in the recent years are: India, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Turkey and most Latin American countries. For further discussion on CCT programmes,
see Medeiros, Brito, and Soares (2008) and Fiszbein and Schady (2009).
2As show Rawlings and Rubio (2003), Skoufias and Maro (2008) and Resende and Oliveira
(2008).
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the availability and reliability of data on less serious crime and petty crime is very
limited.
Unlike the related literature that studies the effect of general social welfare, the
channels through which this relationship occurs are analysed in some detail.3 Here
the analysis is deepened by verifying the specific impact of conditional cash transfer
programmes on crime levels and the potential sources of endogeneity. By
accomplishing this task, it will be possible to shed some light on the effects on crime
rates of this kind of policy originally aimed at reducing poverty and income inequality
through minimum income policy and a conditional component.
Another pivotal difference is that the existing literature on unconditional
programmes generally ignores the crucial endogeneity involved in the relationships
among poverty, income inequality and social welfare programmes.4 If it is present
and not taken into account, the estimates are biased and inconsistent. Temporal
heterogeneity in the implementation of the programme across the states is used in this
paper to identify the causal impact of CCT programmes on poverty and criminality.
CCT programmes have also the advantage of providing significant changes in
social expenditures. The Brazilian CCT programme started in all 27 States in
December 2003, adding up to the existing unconditional programme Continuous Cash
Benefit (CCB), aimed at elderly and disabled poor people that started to operate in
1995. Figure 1.1 shows the trend in homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants, cash
transfers and law enforcement real expenditures5 per capita between 2001 and 2008.6
It is possible to observe the relevance of the change in the cash transfers in 2004 with
the beginning of the Bolsa Familia programme.7 A sharp decrease in the homicide
rate in the same period is also observed.
The discussion of effect of social policies on crime is present in the texts of the
first economists, but since the seminal paper of Becker (1968), economic studies
consider formally the possible effects of socioeconomic variables on criminal
3All papers in this area focus on general social welfare or specific unconditional programmes.
More details in the literature review (section 1.2.2).
4The exceptions are given by Pratt and Godsey (2002) (Homicide only), Johnson, Kantor,
and Fishback (2007) and Worrall (2009) (Homicide only) that use instrumental variables to
account for the simultaneity between welfare expenditure and crime. However, the instruments
are either arguably weak (people immunized for measles, % of voting for Democratic Party and
months of extreme wetness) or do not satisfy the required exclusion restriction for an instrument
(lagged welfare spending).
5This rubric refers to all expenditures on policing, with the vast majority being spent on
wages and equipment.
6All data sources and definitions of the variables are given in the appendix.
7It can also be seen that CCB expenditures were also increasing, even after inflation is taken
into account. This shows the effect of the approach of the new government that proposed to
reach more vulnerable people.
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Figure 1.1: Per Capita Cash Transfers and Law Enforcement Expenditures and
Homicide Rate - Brazil - 2001-2008
Data Sources : STN, MDS and SENASP.
behaviour. However, just recently the specific discussion of the effect of welfare
programmes on criminal behaviour has been formalised. The literature that formally
models the specific effect of social welfare programmes on crime is restricted to three
papers: Benoit and Osborne (1995), Zhang (1997) and Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and
Rupert (2000).
Empirical evidence, usually restricted to homicide rates, is provided by Chamlin,
Cochran, and Lowenkamp (2002), Pratt and Godsey (2002), Burek (2005), Johnson,
Kantor, and Fishback (2007), Savage, Bennett, and Danner (2008) and Worrall (2005,
2009). Ambiguous effects are found. Results are frequently plagued by endogeneity
issues and not always properly addressed.
The effect of CCT programmes on legal income have some features that may
intensify their effects on crime when compared with general welfare programmes.
Firstly, this type of policy is more extensive than other welfare programmes (in Brazil
it reaches about 1/4 of population, which represent the vast majority of the poor
population), which makes one more likely to be affected by the programme, directly
or indirectly; Secondly, the conditional aspect (incentivise children’s education &
health care) would affect the expected income and the decision to engage in the illegal
market; Another distinguishing aspect would be a social altruism effect, where
recipients of the benefit increase their sensation of social protection, making them
more inclined to tolerate higher levels of poverty and income inequality.
Overall, because of its conditional component and extensive coverage, policies of
this kind should also affect the expected income of individuals on the edge to commit
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a crime as well as their attitude towards society and government.
In the following section I discuss the links between CCT programmes and criminal
behaviour. The data used is described in section 1.3. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 analyse the
relationships among CCT, Poverty and Crime. The effect of CCT on crime in provided
in section 1.6 and section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Context
The sign and the magnitude of the effect of CCT programmes on crime is a
relevant question for the policy maker. Welfare policies in general and specifically
CCT programmes are not explicitly aimed at crime reduction, however, its likely effect
on income distribution, especially on poverty could also affect the decisions involved
in the criminal behaviour.
1.2.1 Conceptual Framework
The decision of an individual to commit a crime results from a expected utility
maximization process, in which the individual at the margin would face, on one hand,
the potential net gains arising from the criminal action, the value of punishment and
the likelihood of arrest and conviction and, on the other hand, the opportunity cost of
committing a crime represented by the legal income obtained in the legal labour market
and/or from welfare benefits.8
Theoretical models and empirical findings in economics of crime point out
poverty and income inequality to be major causes of crime.9 In the economic theory
of crime, areas with higher inequality place poor individuals who have low returns
from market activity next to high-income individuals who have goods worth taking,
thereby increasing the returns to time allocated to criminal activity. Faced with the
relative success of others around them unsuccessful individuals feel frustration at
their situation. A rise in inequality may also have a crime-inducing effect by reducing
the individual’s risk aversion and moral threshold to commit a crime (envy effect).
CCT programmes, as some other welfare policies, provide a boost in the income
of the poorest individuals, generally deemed to be more likely to get involved in
criminal activity, because of their lower opportunity costs. These programmes help
individuals to reach a more acceptable subsistence income and also promotes income
8For an extensive critical literature review, see Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008).
9See Bourguignon (1998) for discussion. Huang, Laing, and Wang (2004) propose a search
model analysis on the relation between poverty and crime.
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redistribution, reducing inequalities and the associated “envy effect”. These effects
raise the opportunity cost of crime for the recipients of these programmes, which
affects the propensity of an individual committing a crime. Because the involvement
in illegal activities can result in the loss of the benefit if arrested, recipients have an
additional increase in the opportunity cost.
Therefore, the major effect of CCT programmes on criminal behaviour would come
from the effect on poverty levels and income inequality. However, this type of policy
generally follows a natural rule to provide more resources in regions with higher levels
of poverty. This is especially true in the Bolsa Familia programme, which has a formal
law to determine the amount spent in each state. The amount of resources that should
be spent in each state was based on the levels of poverty obtained by the Census carried
out in 2000. This rule creates a relevant source of endogeneity in the estimation of the
effect of CCT on poverty.
Unlike most welfare programmes, CCT programmes make the payment of the
benefit conditional on health and educational attainments, which implies not only a
higher short term income, but also a higher expected income for the family, given
the programme would provide opportunities for higher levels of education.10 Because
CCT programmes generally have a considerable magnitude, a possible additional effect
is a situation of social altruism, in which the individuals that receive the benefit have
a real perception of the government action, with the approval of the political elite,
creating an environment/sensation of social protection. This effect would raise the
“moral” opportunity costs of committing an illicit act for some individuals.11
1.2.2 Welfare Payments and Crime Literature
The number of papers that investigate the relationship between social welfare
spending and crime is more restricted and more recent than those that analyse similar
issues like the effects of law enforcement on criminality. Moreover, there is no
empirical evidence on this issue for developing countries, where the different
economic environment could lead to contrasting results.
The existing theoretical literature that formally model this specific issue is
restricted to three articles. In general, they suggest that expenditures on welfare
programmes have a negative effect on crime rates, as discussed by Benoit and
10Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Stephen Machin and Vujić (2010) provide empirical evidence
in this direction.
11Sickles and Williams (2008) propose and estimate a dynamic theoretical model where “social
capital” is a relevant aspect to influence criminal behaviour while Buonanno, Montolio, and
Vanin (2009) estimate the effect of several measures of social capital on crime rates.
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Osborne (1995), Zhang (1997) and Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000).12 The
idea behind this negative effect is that the welfare spending would impact the model
with a reduction in incentives to commit a crime by raising the opportunity costs of
the potential criminal.
In Benoit and Osborne (1995), under a theoretical setting, a formal model is
developed in order to integrate spending on social assistance in the economic model
of crime. Consideration is given to how individuals in the society behave in order to
decide the optimal amount of investment in police and welfare payments needed to
reduce crime. Under some specific assumptions, income redistribution reduce crime
rates.
Zhang (1997) establishes a simple economic model in which, under some
assumptions, criminal behaviour is reduced when policies aimed at redistribution are
emphasised. This prediction is confirmed by his empirical findings for the US
economy (Cross-sectional data for States). Reverse causality between Welfare
Payment and crime is tested by using the amount of federal aid to the state
governments and the percentage of the elderly in the population as instruments. No
endogeneity problem in this sense is identified with these data.
In Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000), a general equilibrium model is built in
order to explain the relationship between public expenditures and criminality. The
amount spent on police and income redistribution are determined endogenously
through majority voting. In addition to the theoretical analysis, the authors consider
the effects of increases in public spending on social welfare and in police over crime
rates through calibration. Based on this structural model, it is found that the effect of
the redistribution varies according to the characteristics of each region. However, as
the authors emphasise, due to the fact that the model estimated is static, all possible
dynamic aspects are ignored in these estimates.
Empirical evidence that find a negative effect of welfare programmes on crime
rates is provided by Pratt and Godsey (2002) (Homicide only), Johnson, Kantor, and
Fishback (2007), Savage, Bennett, and Danner (2008) and Worrall (2009) (Homicide
only).
Pratt and Godsey (2002) use a panel data of 46 countries to estimate the relationship
between social support (% of GDP spent on health care and education) and homicide.
The percentage of people immunized for measles is used as instrumental variable. A
negative effect is found and relatively robust. Alternative policies (law enforcement
expenditures) are not considered.
12A few other papers, as Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) and Merlo (2003), consider the
role of redistribution on crime in general terms.
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Johnson, Kantor, and Fishback (2007) explore a panel data set for 81 large
American cities in order to estimate the effect of the relief effort in the years
following the great depression. By using instrumental variables (mean of percentage
voting for the Democratic Party and months of extreme wetness) the authors find a
negative effect of public welfare spending on crime rates.
Savage, Bennett, and Danner (2008) analyse a panel data set of 25 countries for
13 years to explore the relationship between crime and social welfare spending. After
unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic aspects are considered, a negative and
curvilinear (by adding a quadratic term) relationship is found. Short run and long run
results vary in sign and statistical significance. Endogeneity issues are not mentioned.
Alternative policies (law enforcement expenditures) are not considered.
Worrall (2009) re-estimates the model considered in Worrall (2005) taking the
likely endogeneity issues into account. A panel data from California counties is used
in order to assess the effect of welfare spending on homicide. The lagged welfare
spending is used as instrument. A negative effect is found, but it is not robust to
different econometric approaches and specifications.13
The other papers on this issue find little or no evidence of the effect of social
welfare spending on criminal behaviour, as argued by Chamlin, Cochran, and
Lowenkamp (2002) (except homicide), Burek (2005) (less serious crimes) and
Worrall (2005). Some of them predict no relationship between those variables or even
a positive relationship when endogeneity issues are not taken into account and others
do not encounter any effect even when the appropriate econometric models are
considered.14
As discussed below, the econometric estimation of the relationship between welfare
payments and crime is complicated by the likely presence of problems of endogeneity
via poverty. It can also be argued that the welfare expenditures are intensified in places
and/or in periods of higher economic hardship or poverty. Section 1.5 provides some
empirical evidence on this issue. It is therefore not surprising to find that crime in its
13Two papers were published after the first drafts of the present paper that also exploit the
timing of welfare programmes, but in a very different fashion. The first one is Foley (2011) that
exploits a daily database on crime in the US and find that crime rates increase over the course
of monthly welfare payment cycles. The second one is Chioda, De Mello, and Soares (2012)
(that acknowledges the present paper as the first to examine the relationship between CCT
and crime) that also examines the impact of CCT on crime, but only at urban schools areas
in one Brazilian city, São Paulo. They exploit the expansion of the Bolsa Familia programme
to families with adolescents in 2008 to identify the relationship. They find some evidence of a
negative relationship between Bolsa Familia and an overall index of crime, but with very small
magnitudes. They do not find any significant impact of Bolsa Familia on theft and vandalism.
14Witte and Witt (2001) also provides an extensive discussion on the government role to
reduce crime rates.
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various forms is positively correlated with the spending on welfare. This problem may
be controlled for by using the appropriate econometric methods.
1.2.3 Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes: The Bolsa Familia Case
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are policy mechanisms aimed at
reducing poverty by making welfare programmes conditional upon the receivers’
actions. The government only transfers the money to individuals/families that meet
specific criteria. In addition, after these agents have engaged in the programme and in
order to keep the benefit they must follow some educational and health
requirements.15
This kind of policy provides emergency assistance, while the conditionalities
(requirement to the families) promote long-term investments in human capital. This
kind of policy addresses the problem of underinvestment in human capital not only by
compensating individuals in the short-term for the real costs of investing in health,
nutrition, and education, but also by adding requirements for households to use public
services that have long-term payoff in these areas.16
CCT programmes have some important features that distinguish them from other
welfare programmes. Firstly, they have eligibility requirements and conditionalities
over the recipients’ actions. Additionally, the grant is paid in cash, providing a
minimum income. Another distinguishing feature is that the responsible individual for
the benefit is almost always a woman. In the Bolsa familia programme, the percentage
of households where the payment is made to an adult female is around 95%.
In the last few years the Brazilian government has significantly boosted cash
transfers policies to poor people. Two major welfare programmes are now being
carried out in Brazil: Continuous Cash Benefit (CCB) and Bolsa Familia (BF).
CCB is a cash transfer programme implemented in the country in 1995 and aimed
at individuals over 65 and/or with severe disabilities. In both cases the income per
capita in the family must be below 1/4 of the minimum wage.17
15For further details on CCT programmes, see Fiszbein and Schady (2009).
16Several empirical papers address these issues, as Gertler (2004), Glewwe and Kassouf (2008)
and Reis (2010). In general they provide evidence that CCT programmes are effective to boost
recipients’ health and education.
17It should not be confused with a pension or retirement benefit. This confusion is common
even among recipients of this benefit.
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Bolsa Familia is a conditional cash transfer programme that took place in all 27
Brazilian states at the end of 2003 targeted at families with low income.18 It is mainly
aimed at poor families with children and establishes education and health
requirements.19
As with most CCT programmes around the world, the payment of the Bolsa
Familia transfer is made directly to the recipient. The money comes from the federal
government, with no involvement of the state or municipality administrations. Once
the family is registered and considered eligible to receive the benefit, someone in the
household will receive a bank card that can be used exclusively to withdraw the cash
from the programme in any branch of the largest government-owned bank in Brazil.20
The person withdrawing the money is, in almost all cases, a woman, even if she is not
considered the head of the family in other contexts.
However, the transfer would only start taking place at a monthly basis to a family
after the local governments had registered all individuals in the household into a central
database.21 The continuation of the monthly payments is conditional on the children
having a school attendance rate of least 85% and younger children (up to 7 years old)
having their vaccination cards, where all history of vaccines are held, up to date and
according to the timetable recommended by the Ministry of Health.
The payments of the Bolsa Familia benefit can be suspended or cancelled if any of
the educational and health conditions are not met. The family can also stop receiving
the benefits if the level of income per capita (excluding the benefit) surpass the
minimum threshold (1/4 of the Brazilian minimum wage per capita).
As mentioned above, the Bolsa Familia benefit is paid directly to the final recipient
by the federal government. However, the municipality government also participates in
the process by registering the potential receivers of the benefit. The participation of the
state government is restricted to the administrative and technical support to the local
governments.
18Bolsa Familia was a programme that provided additional income to most poor families in
Brazil. Nevertheless, there were previous programmes of smaller magnitude that were absorbed
into the new programme, like Bolsa Escola, Vale Gas etc. Data on those programmes were not
included in this paper. However, this omission will only underestimate any effect found.
19For further discussion on cash transfer programmes in Brazil, see Medeiros, Brito, and
Soares (2008).
20The bank is Caixa Econômica Federal, which is the forth largest bank in Brazil, with
branches in all states and in most of the 5570 municipalities in Brazil. The recipients can
alternatively withdraw the money in one of the more numerous Casas Lotéricas, offical lottery
stores registered by Caixa Econômica Federal.
21This is a relatively famous database in Brazil, named Cadastro Único, where all Bolsa
Familia recipients need to be registered to receive the benefit.
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In 2009 Bolsa Familia was the largest conditional cash transfer programme in
the world, although the Mexican programme Oportunidades was the first nation-wide
programme of this kind. I compare the figures related to the cash transfers programmes
in Brazil in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Bolsa Familia and CCB’s Figures - Jan-Dec - 2009
Bolsa Familia CCB
Amount Spent US$ 6,610,220,967 US$ 9,917,301,532
Families receiving the benefit 12,472,540 3,166,845
People receiving the benefit 51,636,316 13,110,738
Average Benefit per person per year US$ 529.98 US$ 3,131.60
Percentage of Federal Social Expenditures 37.26% 57.01%
Percentage of National Social Expenditures 33.53% 51.32%
Percentage of Federal Total Expenditures 0.76% 1.16%
Percentage of GDP 0.33% 0.51%
Sources : Calculated by the author with data from the National Treasury Secretariat and
Ministry of Social Development.
Notes: Monetary figures converted from Real (R$). People receiving the benefit and
derived quantities are estimates.
The average value of the Continuous Cash Benefit (CCB) per person per year is
almost 6 times higher than the average value paid for Bolsa Familia recipients. Data
from the PNAD22 shows the average annual income per capita in poor households,23
excluding benefits, was US$ 577.65, 24 which evidences that the Bolsa Familia
benefit represent almost half of the income in an average household receiving the
benefit. The impact on the initial income of the families is even more substantial if the
average income is calculated only for families below the line of extreme poverty25
(US$ 267.57).
Social welfare policies are accomplished by the three levels of government.26
Nevertheless, unlike other areas, such as spending on police, the percentage that each
level of government applies in welfare programmes varies considerably across states
22National Survey of Household Sample run by IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics.
23Monthly income per capita in the household below 1/2 of the value of the monthly minimum
wage.
24Values converted from Real (R$) in 31 December 2009.
25Households with income per capita in the below 1/4 of the value of the monthly minimum
wage.
26In Brazil, the governmental attributions are carried out by federal, state and municipality
administrations.
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and over the years. The amount the Federal Government spends on welfare represents
about 90% of the whole expenditure in the states. In 2009 those two programmes
represented about 94% of all federal spending on social welfare. Expenditure on
Bolsa Familia corresponds to approximately 2/3 of the amount spent on Continuous
Cash Benefit, although the former covers 4 times more families. Another relevant fact
is that such expenditures account for less than 2% of the federal budget. It should be
also noticed that, unlike many developing countries, effectively all resources for
funding Bolsa Familia and CCB expenditures come from federal tax revenue, with
insignificant contribution from foreign aid.
1.3 Data
A new data set is created by linking aggregate variables I constructed from the
state representative socioeconomic micro data from annual Brazilian house survey of
PNAD (National Survey of Household Sample by the IBGE - Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics) with the criminal registers from the Public Security national
agency, from 2001 to 2008.27
1.3.1 Criminal Data
I use data from SENASP - National Secretariat of Public Security, agency of the
Ministry of Justice, which compiles information from the State Secretariats of Public
Security, and indicators of the incidence of crime in the Brazilian states the following
indices: murder rate per 100 thousand inhabitants, total rate of robberies per 100
thousand inhabitants, total rate of theft per 100 thousand inhabitants and extortion
through kidnapping rate per 100 thousand inhabitants. The data are to be used
annually for all 27 federal units of Brazil and covering the period from 2001 to
2008.28 Alternative measures of homicide rates are also calculated using data from
the Ministry of Health, that provides state level data.29
27I computed all variables from PNAD, except the variables associated with income, computed
by IPEA, as specified in table 1.7 in the appendix.
28The national agency decided not to make public the figure for property crimes for some
states after 2005. For that reason, this type of crime will be analysed over the period between
2001 and 2005.
29Murder are always intentional crimes, whereas homicide comprises both voluntary and
involuntary killing.
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1.3.2 Expenditures on Cash Transfers and Law Enforcement
As mentioned before, the two main federal welfare programs are direct cash
transfers: Bolsa Familia, aimed at poor people, especially those with young children
and Continuous Cash Benefit, which is primarily aimed at elderly and disabled people.
The variable used in this chapter is the sum spent on both programmes per capita and
corrected for inflation. Data come from the Ministry of Social Development (MDS).
Information about the law enforcement spending and revenue of the states was
obtained from the Bulletin of Public Finance of Brazil, issued by the Secretariat of the
National Treasury (STN). Such information relates to all public expenditure made by
state governments and the Federal District within the respective units of the federation.
The variables used were corrected for inflation using INPC index from IBGE with 2007
as the base year.
Like the other public expenditures in Brazil, law enforcement is run by all the
three levels of government: Federal, State and Municipality governments. However,
as usually happens for all types of expenditures in Brazil, the main responsibility lies
with one of these levels. Law enforcement is a primary duty of state governments. In
fact, the total amount spent on police in the Brazilian States in 2007 is about 88% made
by the state governments.
1.3.3 Poverty Rates and other Explanatory Variables
Poverty Rates and the other explanatory variables were constructed by
aggregating state representative micro data of PNAD (National Survey of Household
Sample by the IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) from 2001 to
2008. Besides poverty rates and extreme poverty rates, other poverty related measures
are calculated. Poverty lines were determined as a function of minimum consumption
levels.30 The other variables considered are income inequality (GINI index), years of
schooling, average labour income, unemployment rate, % of one-parent households,
percentage of young males, informality degree in the labour market. I correct all the
monetary variables for inflation using INPC index from IBGE with 2007 as the base
30Poverty is measured here using the standard index (FGT index) suggested by Foster, Greer,







, where N is the total number of households, yi
is the per capita income of the ith household, z is the poverty line, q is the number of poor
individuals. With α=0, the FGT measure becomes the incidence of poverty index P(0) or simply
the percentage of the population that is below the poverty line (poverty rate). With α=1 the
FGT measure gives the poverty gap P(1), a measure of the average intensity of poverty. With
α=2, the FGT index becomes the severity of poverty index.
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year. Table 1.7 in the appendix summarizes the description of each variable used in
the estimates, and the origin of the data.31
1.4 Empirical Framework
In this section I present the empirical relationships of interest. However, the main
purpose of the following paragraphs is to discuss the inherent problems of estimating
the effect of welfare programmes on crime rates.
The basic assumption is that CCT programmes affect poverty rates, as described
by:
Povit = αi + πt + w
′
itσ + ρCCTit + τit (1.1)
where Povit represents the poverty rate in each state i in a specific year t, CCTit
represents the amount per capita spent in cash transfers, wit is a vector of covariates,
αi and πt are respectively state and year fixed effects.
Furthermore, in order to pursuit principles of efficiency and fairness, the
policymaker generally establishes a rule that assures more resources to the poorer
regions. This fact establishes the following relationship:
CCTit = φi + λt + x
′
it%+ θPovit + µit (1.2)
where xit is a vector of factors that can also affect the policy maker’s allocation
decisions, φi and λt are respectively state and year fixed effects.
Consider now equation 1.3 that describes the determinants of crime rates,32
depending on expenditures on law enforcement,33 poverty rates and a vector with
other control variables zit:
Crimeit = ψi + ωt + z
′
itβ + γLawit−1 + δPovit + εit. (1.3)
Crimeit is one of the crime rates mentioned before: Murder, Homicide, Robbery,
Theft and Kidnapping (per 100,000 inhabitants). Lawit−1 is the total expenditure in
law enforcement per capita in the previous period, z′it is a vector of socioeconomic
31Figure 1.9 in the appendix depicts the income distribution in Brazil before and after the
implementation of the programme.
32The theoretical and the empirical literature in the economics of crime converge for a similar
specification. However, poverty rate is often omitted.
33Law enforcement itself could also be potentially endogenous due to the simultaneity with
crime rates. The use of lagged law enforcement would minimise that problem. As argued by
Chalfin and McCrary (2013) this endogeneity is less likely to be the case as the response from
the policy makers in the short run is very limited.
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variables, namely: income inequality (GINI index), years of schooling, average labour
income, unemployment rate, % of one-parent households, informality degree in the
labour market and ψi and ωt are respectively state and year fixed effects.34
As discussed before, the underlying assumption is that individuals are maximisers
of their respective expected utility, making rational choices in order to participate in the
criminal sector in response to the costs and benefits of illegal activities and in relation
to the alternative gain from the legal market. This specification attempts to capture
the fact that the participation of an individual in criminal activities depends on the
monetary return on these actions in relation to legal activities, the economic conditions
under which the individual is living, their cultural and social condition (including the
environment that he/she is surrounded) and the degree in which the police system is
able to affect the likelihood of imprisonment and punishment.
One assuming exogeneity of the redistribution policy would ignore equation 1.2
and estimate the effect of cash transfers on crime rates after plugging equation 1.1 on
equation 1.3. However, as it will be shown in the next section, an endogenous resources
allocation should hold in most situations, leading to inconsistent estimates.35
Another confounding factor would raise if the cash transfers are assumed to affect
crime rates directly (not only through poverty rates). That would account for any social
altruism effect on the potential criminals, as the social program would make them
perceive a real presence of the government in their lives. The benefit would then have
an effect on the individuals’ decisions beyond the monetary transfer. If this is the case,
the error term in the equation 1.3 would be εit = ηCCTit + ζit. 36
Therefore, in order to consistently estimate the effect of cash transfers on crime
rates, these endogeneity problems must be taken into consideration.
34As emphasised by Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), there are at least three reasons to expect
the presence of the terms of spatial and time unobserved heterogeneity ψi and ωt. First, it is to
be expected that there are unobserved heterogeneity such as cultural characteristics relatively
stable over time, what makes some states to have higher crime rates than others. A second
reason is to account for the presence of measurement error in the rates of crime. Time-specific
effects common to all states, like changes in federal law, justifies the presence of ωt.
35Another possibility would be to use CCT as an IV for Pov. That not only would generate
inconsistent estimates as the measure of the effect of CCT on crime would be lost.
36An alternative approach, where CCT is explicitly included in the crime equation, is also
considered in the appendix. Similar problems of endogeneity would arise.
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1.5 Effect of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes on
Poverty
1.5.1 Will CCT always reduce Poverty?
The effect of CCT expenditures on Poverty is not obvious as it initially seems.
One important reason is the simultaneity between poverty and this kind of policy.
Poorer places often are focused in the distribution of resources, which creates a
confounding factor in the analysis.
Another important issue is that more cash transfers may affect fertility and family
formation decisions, diluting the expected reduction in poverty levels. It may also
reduce the incentives to mothers to work, reducing the total income in the family.
Although this type of governmental action will alleviate poverty, the additional
resource will not necessarily make a poor family “non-poor” if it is very far below the
poverty line.
1.5.2 A More Detailed Look on the Data
Figure 1.2 shows the correlations between CCT expenditures per capita and
poverty rates across the Brazilian states between 2001 and 2008. By observing the
very different correlations in each case, the reason for being careful in estimating the
relationship becomes clear.
Figure 1.2a shows a positive correlation between cash transfers and poverty in the
pooled data. When time effects are added, the relationship becomes stronger and with
a higher slope (figure 1.2b). This suggests that once the time dimension is removed,
higher poverty rates imply more money being spent on cash transfers.
However, when alternatively state specific effects are included, the relationship
becomes negative, as show figure 1.2c. A similar result is obtained when both time
and state effects are taken into account, but with a lower slope, as show figure 1.2d.
This could indicate that once the state specific unobserved heterogeneity is removed
more resources for cash transfers results in lower levels of poverty.
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(a) Pooled (b) Time Effects
(c) State Effects (d) State and Time Effects
Figure 1.2: Real Per capita Cash Transfers Expenditures and Poverty Rates
Data Sources : MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
Table 1.2 presents the regression results for the cases illustrated, including average
labour income as a control, in order to capture reductions in poverty due to
improvements in the labour market. A negative and statistically significant coefficient
prevails when time and state effects are considered.
This analysis suggests that the association between cash transfers and poverty is
negative and significant. The coefficients of the last equation correspond to elasticities
of -0.0691 and -0.3929 for respectively Cash Transfers and Average Labour Income.
However, as seen above, endogeneity is present in this relationship: because poorer
states receive more cash transfers, this prevents any causal interpretation of the results.
In spite of the fact that fixed effects estimation could mitigate concerns about this
problem.
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Table 1.2: Cash Transfers Expenditures and Poverty Rates: State and Time Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Cash Transfers 0.050** -0.084*** -0.050*** 0.361*** -0.042*** -0.029**
(0.016) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
Avg. Labour Income -0.022*** -0.018***
(0.008) (0.004)
Constant 30.9*** 41.9*** 56.6*** -23.9*** 39.3*** 51.4***
(1.971) (0.544) (3.015) (2.513) (1.101) (4.196)
State Effects no yes yes no yes yes
Time Effects no no no yes yes yes
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216
R2 0.0251 0.6033 0.6189 0.5292 0.6887 0.7598
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on state in parentheses.
p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects, respectively: 0.0000 ;
0.0000; 0.0000. Robust Hausman test rejects Random Effects: p-value=0.0001. p-value test for
heteroscedasticity = 0.0000. p-value of the test for strict exogeneity = 0.6597. Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation in panel data does not reject H0: no first-order autocorrelation: p-value=0.0894
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data Sources: SENASP/MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
Therefore, a source of exogenous variation is necessary to identify this effect. As
shown in the next section, a specific characteristic in the timing of the distribution of
the resources helps to identify the relationship between CCT spending and poverty
rates.
Another important concern would be serial correlation. The Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation in panel data does not reject the null hypothesis of no first-order
autocorrelation. However, as the non-rejection is only marginal (p-value=0.0894), it
could be argued that autocorrelation is present and first-difference (FD) estimator
should be used. The estimated coefficients with the FD estimator (not reported) are
very similar to the FE estimates, but with larger standard errors, suggesting the FD
estimator is inefficient in this analysis. 37
37Wooldridge (2002) highlights the fact that if the idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated, first
differencing will introduce serial correlation in the analysis.
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1.5.3 Constructing exogenous variation of CCT programmes
As figure 1.3 show, some states had a more intensive change of total cash transfers
(after Bolsa Familia Programme in 2004) than others. The guidelines of Bolsa Familia
programme established that the amount of resources available for each state should be
based on the poverty levels in 2000. However, by reasons unrelated to poverty levels
and crime rates, some states were able to implement the programme to a greater extent
more quickly than others. As it will be shown, the heterogeneity in the promptness of
the implementation of the programme was not associated with poverty or crime rates.
It is more likely that such variation is related to the degree of efficiency or bureaucracy
of the local governments in each state.
Figure 1.3: Total Cash Transfers over time by State
Data Source: MDS.
Another way to see this is to observe that some states had a significant increase in
cash transfer spending in the 2004 with the beginning of Bolsa Familia programme.
Those states had a smaller variation in cash transfers between 2004 and 2008 than the
states that had a “late” start.
Because the guidelines of the programme establish that the amount of resources for
each state depends on the poverty levels of the 2000 census, it is interesting to examine
the relationship between poverty rates in 2000 and Cash Transfers expenditures in 2004
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and 2008. Figure 1.4 displays those relationships for Bolsa Familia only and total cash
transfers (Bolsa Familia+ CCB).
(a) Bolsa Familia (b) Total Cash Transfers
Figure 1.4: Poverty Rates in 2000 X Per Capita Cash Transfers Expenditures (R$ -
2007)
Data Sources : MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
In a situation of perfect implementation of the programme according to its
guidelines, this relationship would be a graph proportional to a 45 degrees line.38
However, in 2004 many states spend less than they were supposed to be spending.
The resources were available from the federal government, but because some states
and local governments were not able to register all eligible recipients, the money was
not fully spent. Note that in 2008 most states reach the full implementation of the
programme.
Figure 1.5 presents the distribution of variation in Bolsa Familia between 2004 and
2008. The variation in CCT spending between 2004 and 2008 was between 40% and
150% and 5 out of 27 states had variation above 100%.
38Strictly speaking, because the amount of money varies with the number and age of children
in a family, the present graph would never be a perfect 45 degrees line. However, this is a good
approximation to convey the idea of compliance.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of variation in Real Per Capita Cash Transfers between 2004
and 2008
Data Source: MDS.
As mentioned above, this heterogeneity could stem from different operational
capabilities and efforts among states. On one hand, it is possible to argue that states
with higher poverty rates would be more determined to implement the programme as
soon as possible. On the other hand, it is likely that states with a higher relative
number of poor individuals would face more difficulties to identify and register all
eligible families. As it is discussed below, poverty rates do not seem to have played a
significant role in the promptness of the execution of the programme. The efficiency
of the local governments and political issues in the states were more likely to
determine the speed of the implementation.
The heterogeneity in the implementation of the Bolsa Familia programme allows
the definition of an artificial control group, as some states lag considerably behind in a
way that they virtually do not put the programme into practical effect when compared
with the levels of the programme in the same state a few years later or with the level of
implementation observed in other states.
In order to account for the levels of poverty before the rollout of the Bolsa Familia
programme and the fact that even states that had a very slow start in the implementation
of the programme, actually had some families receiving the Bolsa Familia benefits, I
use the differences-in-differences (DD) approach.
If unobserved factors, such as the efficiency of the local governments are the main
drivers to determine the speed of the implementation and they are relatively stable over
time, the DD approach will account for such unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to take advantage of this heterogeneous variation in the implementation in




1, if CCT gap in state i in 2004 is below 75th percentile value (Low Gap)
0, otherwise (High Gap)
(1.4)
And defining pov1 to be the poverty rate before the beginning of the programme
(2004) and pov2 poverty rate to after the programme started, DD estimator in this
context can be defined as:







The DD estimate δ̂ can be obtained by estimating:
povit = α + βDi + γ1(After Programme)t + δDi · 1(After Programme)t + εit
(1.6)
or equivalently:
povit = α + δDi · 1(After Programme)t + φi + λt + εit (1.7)
where 1(·) is an indicator function and φi and λt denote respectively state and time
effects.
A crucial assumption in the DD framework is that λt is common across “treated”
and “untreated”.39 This assumption can be tested by running the following regression:
povit = α + δDi · 1(After Programme)t + ψit+ φi + λt + εit (1.8)
In the case of poverty, significant values for ψi and insignificant value for δ tell us
that the dependent variable would be declining even without treatment. In any case,
the pre-treatment data must establish a clear trend that can be extrapolated into the
post-treatment period.
Table 1.3 displays the averages for the relevant variables for both high and low
variation in CCT expenditures between 2004 and 2008.40
Apart from murder and homicide rates, all other variables have no significant
differences between the groups, corroborating the assumption that this variation was
exogenous in this context. Table 1.10 in the appendix presents the regression of
poverty rates in 2001 on the variation in CCT expenditures between 2004 and 2008.
39See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) for further discussion.
40Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) highlight the importance of comparing descriptive statistics
in this setting.
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No statistical significance is found in the relationship, whereas a similar regression on
the variation in the spending between 2003 and 2004 is positive and significant.
Figure 1.8 in the appendix presents the spatial distribution of these variables, which
also corroborate this idea.
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 in the appendix replicate table 1.3 the threshold in equation 1.4
are replaced by respectively the mean and the median of the distribution of variation in
the cash transfers. The conclusions about the significant differences for the outcome
variables across the sub-samples are unaltered, except to robbery rates that are now
statistically different and homicide rates that are now statistically indistinguishable
across the groups.
Because the averages of murder and homicide rates are statistically smaller in states
with a swifter implementation of the Bolsa Familia programme relative to the averages
for states with a slow implementation when the threshold is the 75th percentile of
the distribution of variation in the cash transfers, the difference-in-difference approach
described above would not be appropriate for those variables. A significant difference
is also observed for robbery rates when the thresholds are the mean and the median.
Nevertheless, I will keep those variables in the ensuing analysis to contrast with the
results for the other variables.
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Table 1.3: Selected variables for different levels in the implementation of Bolsa Familia (Perc. Var. in CCT > 75 percentile)
Whole Sample 2003-2004
Low Gap High Gap t-test Low Gap High Gap t-test
(Di = 1) (Di = 0) on diff. (Di = 1) (Di = 0) on diff.
Murder Rate 20.8405 28.4798 -4.52 19.9952 27.7501 -2.51
Homicide Rate (Health) 24.1419 34.1217 -5.72 23.7479 33.2542 -2.76
Robbery Rate 352.6788 379.1966 -0.54 341.8772 392.7397 -0.66
Theft Rate 1130.9132 1037.4245 0.74 1160.1571 1011.8172 0.67
Kidnapping Rate 0.3667 0.3482 0.17 0.3339 0.2698 0.47
Poverty Rate 0.3495 0.3573 -0.31 0.3894 0.3991 -0.18
Extreme Poverty Rate 0.1407 0.1356 0.36 0.1653 0.1634 0.06
Gini Index 0.5572 0.5447 1.85 0.5616 0.5488 1.23
Average Labour Income 742.1845 749.7728 -0.17 703.7415 716.9822 -0.16
Informality in the Labour Market 56.1774 55.7940 0.22 56.7759 56.7265 0.01
Single-Parent Households 0.2764 0.2877 -1.46 0.2763 0.28968 -1.08
Notes: High Gap and Low Gap as defined in equation 1.4. Data Sources: See appendix 1.A.2.
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Figure 1.6: Poverty X Cash Transfers for different levels of variation in Cash Transfers
Data Source: MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
1.5.4 Effect of CCT on Poverty
Figure 1.6 presents the effects of CCT on Poverty for different levels of variation.
The reduction of poverty is slightly stronger for states that had a faster increase in total
cash transfers after the program Bolsa Familia.
The estimation of differences-in-differences effect described by equation 1.6 is
presented by table 1.4.41
The estimate of the relevant parameter δ is -0.0312. This 3.12 percentage points
represents approximately an additional reduction of 7.5% in poverty rates in states that
distributed the resources of CCT more quickly. It is a sizable magnitude, but it is even
more significant if it is taken into consideration that the programme is also present in
the “control” states. It is worth noting that poverty rates are not statistically different
between the groups.42
Table 1.5 displays alternative procedures in the estimation of δ in order to check
the robustness of the results.43
Similar effects are found when variations and percent variations are used, as well as
41One possible alternative would be to use Di · 1(After Programme)t as an instrumental
variable for Povit in the crime equation. However, this approach would make the measure of
the effect of CCT on crime to be lost.
42It should be noticed that because the number of clusters is 27, the underlying statistical
test can over-reject the significance of the coefficients. As suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller (2008), I use bootstrapped standard errors to mitigate this problem.
43Reporting a sensitivity analysis in this context is essential to the legitimacy of the results as
pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2010).
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Table 1.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Poverty Rates for different levels in the
implementation of Bolsa Familia Program, before and after 2004
Low Gap High Gap Difference: (i) - (ii)
(Di = 1) (Di = 0)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Poverty Rate Before 2004 0.3960*** 0.3809*** 0.0150
(0.0213) (0.0360) (0.0437)
Poverty Rate After 2004 0.3217*** 0.3378*** -0.0161
(0.0159) (0.0275) (0.0223)
Change in Poverty -0.0742*** -0.0430*** -0.0312***
(0.0263) (0.0452) (0.0135)
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the state level in
parentheses. High Gap and Low Gap as defined in equation 1.4. Similar results for Di
defined using mean and median as threshold. Similar significance when standard errors are
bootstrapped. Number of obs. before: 81, after: 135. Without considering groups, the total
decline in poverty was -0.0672 (-6.72 perc. points).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data Sources: MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
other thresholds to define the levels of gap. The estimated δ does not vary significantly
to the addition of different covariates, providing additional evidence of the exogeneity
of the variation of the CCT expenditures between 2004 and 2008 relative to poverty.
It is also possible to argue that these results are based on a convergence effect,
where poorer states would improve faster anyway. In order to control for that, three
strategies are considered. The first controls for intensity of poverty - P(1)44, which is
a measure of distance from poverty line. The second one uses poverty rates in 2001
as a control. However this has the downside of preventing the use of fixed effects,
since it is a constant over time. To get around this issue a slightly different approach
is considered. In this third way, a new variable is defined so that it assumes the values
of 2001’s poverty rates if the year is before 2002 (inclusive) and 2003’s values if the
year is after 2003 (inclusive). In all cases, the estimates of the effort of cash transfers
on poverty rates are quite similar to the previous approaches.
This relative robustness corroborates the assumption of random distribution of
states into the different speeds of implementation of the program and consequently
the causal interpretation of the estimates.
Because the values of extreme poverty are generally less than half of those of
poverty and the estimated coefficient have similar sizes, the effect of CCT on extreme
44As defined in subsection 1.3.3.
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Table 1.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates - Poverty and Extreme Poverty:
Estimates for δ under Alternative Specifications
(1) (2)
Left hand side variable: Poverty Extreme Poverty
State-specific trends as controls -0.0434** -0.0255**
(Equation 1.8) (0.0253) (0.0132)
Median as threshold -0.0306*** -0.0214***
(0.0105) (0.0098)
2003/2004 comparison -0.0354* -0.0283**
(0.0184) (0.0151)
Socio-economic variables as controls -0.0216** -0.0194**
(0.0109) (0.0088)
Intensity of Poverty as Control -0.0312*** -0.0256**
(P(1) - Distance from Poverty Line) (0.0127) (0.0092)
Poverty in 2001 as Control (No Fixed Effects) -0.0321** -0.0199**
(0.0141) (0.0089)
Poverty in 2001/2003 as Control (Fixed Effects) -0.0298** -0.0201***
(Poverty in 2001 if year ≤ 2002, 2003 if year ≥ 2003) (0.0142) (0.0097)
Notes: All coefficients refer to the DD estimates (δ̂). Standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the state level in parentheses. Similar significance
when standard errors are bootstrapped. “Poverty” reads “Extreme poverty” for control
variables in column (2). All control variables used are significant at least at 0.05 level.
Regression with socio-economic variables controlled for average labour income, average
years of schooling and degree of informality in the labour market. For details about those
variables, see table 1.7.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data Sources: MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
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poverty is much more intense. This corroborates the hypothesis that many people are
still poor even after receiving the benefit.
1.6 Estimating the Impact of CCT on Crime
The following figures show the association between crime rates and cash transfers
for states with different speeds in the implementation of Bolsa Familia programme as
defined by equation 1.4.
(a) Homicide Rates (b) Robbery Rates
(c) Theft Rates (d) Kidnapping Rates
Figure 1.7: Crime rates X Cash Transfers: Different levels of variation in Cash Transfers
Bolsa Familia
Data Sources : SENASP/IPEA/PNAD.
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Figure 1.7a shows a weak positive relationship between Homicide and Cash
Transfers and no significant difference between high and low treatment.45 There is
also a positive association for Robbery, however with a significantly smaller slope for
states with faster spending (Figure 1.7b).
In the case of theft and kidnapping rates, different relationships between crime
and cash transfers for different levels of treatment emerge: increased cash transfers
is associated with lower theft and kidnapping rates for states with lower gap in CCT
(Figures 1.7c and 1.7d).
The estimation of the effect of CCT on crime rates using the
differences-in-differences (DD) framework used in the previous section and other
robustness checks are presented in table 1.6.
As discussed in section 1.5.3, the averages of murder and homicide are statistically
different across the high and low gap groups defined in terms of the 75th percentile of
the distribution of variation in the cash transfers, and therefore, the results for those
variables are not valid. They are only kept in the analysis to contrast the result for
those variables with the results obtained for the other variables. The only valid result
for those categories of crime would be for the thresholds defined in terms of the mean
and the median. In any case, it can be observed that they are not statistically significant
in any specification.
Significant negative effects are found for robbery, theft and kidnapping for some
definitions of low gap in the implementation of the programme. That is in line with
Johnson, Kantor, and Fishback (2007) that find that relief spending after the great
depression in the US has a negative effect on burglary, robbery and auto theft, but no
significant impact on murder, aggravated assault and rape.
In order to test the robustness of the DD estimates, it is necessary to account for
socio-economic variables and law enforcement expenditures. It is well established
in the economics of crime literature that variables associated to the probability of
punishment are endogenous.46 I use tax revenue in the states in the previous year
as an instrument to law enforcement, as those two variables are correlated and it can
be argued that tax revenue would only affect crime rates through the extent of law
enforcement expenditures.
45Very similar picture for murder rates (not reported here).
46See Levitt (1997) and McCrary (2002) for discussion.
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Table 1.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Crime Rates for different levels in
the implementation of Bolsa Familia Program, before and after 2004 - Alternative
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Murder Homicide Robbery Theft Kidnapping
75th percentile as threshold in Di -0.739 -0.489 -39.525** -43.685* -0.066*
(3.183) (0.307) (21.561) (26.426) (0.043)
Median as threshold in Di 2.779 4.623 -16.809* -37.849 -0.109**
(2.779) (2.955) (9.033) (55.590) (0.062)
2003/2004 comparison -0.328 -0.399 -52.581 -81.932 -0.701*
(0.424) (0.831) (135.563) (91.477) (0.413)
Socioeconomic variables and -1.125 -1.692 -8.511 -56.145* -0.064
Law Enforcement as controls (3.220) (2.838) (13.981) (30.436) (0.228)
(IV = Tax Revenue(t-1) )
Socioeconomic variables and -1.382 -1.338 -32.612 -51.196 0.138
Law Enforcement(t-1) as controls (2.880) (1.761) (39.404) (39.052) (0.131)
Notes : All coefficients refer to the DD estimates (δ̂). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering at the state level in parentheses. Similar significance when standard errors are
bootstrapped. Regression with socio-economic variables controlled for income inequality, average
labour income, years of schooling, unemployment rate, % of male aged between 15 and 24, %
of households with only one parent, and degree of informality in the labour market. For details
about those variables, see table 1.7.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data Sources: SENASP/MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
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The fourth line of table 1.6 present the DD estimates when socio-economic
variables and law enforcement expenditures are used as controls and tax revenue as an
instrumental variable. Only theft still has a significant from a more prompt
implementation of the Bolsa Familia programme, when other relevant factors that
affect crime are taken into account.
It can be argued that tax revenue is not a suitable instrument in this context as it
could be that case that it is not excluded from the crime equation. One alternative
approach is simply to use law enforcement expenditures lagged in one period.
The use of lagged law enforcement would minimise that problem. Furthermore as
argued by Chalfin and McCrary (2013), this endogeneity is less likely to be the case as
the response from the policy makers in the short run is very limited.
The model is re-estimated using this approach and it is presented in the last line of
table 1.6. No significant effect is observed with this approach.47
This result is in line with other papers that find little or no evidence of the effect
of social welfare spending on criminal behaviour, namely Chamlin, Cochran, and
Lowenkamp (2002), Burek (2005) and Worrall (2005).
47First differences lead to similar results, but with even larger standard errors.
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1.7 Conclusions
Heterogenous implementation of Bolsa Familia programme is used in order to
identify the effect of this CCT programme on poverty and crime rates. Bolsa Familia
has a significant effect on poverty reduction. States that reached the level of cash
transfers expenditures proposed by the guidelines of the programme more promptly
had a more significant reduction in poverty rates. However, many recipients of the
programme are still below the poverty line.
Some results suggest that CCT expenditures contribute to reduction in robbery,
theft and kidnapping rates, while no significant effect was found for homicide and
murder. These findings would indicate that property crime would be more sensitive to
CCT programmes. However, the results are not robust to different specifications and
the inclusion of socio-economic variables and law enforcement expenditures. The
positive or insignificant effect for the other types of crimes may suggest that the
proposed approach is not efficient to correct the endogeneity problems in the crime
equations.
Another possibility might be related to the fact that many people receiving the
benefits are still poor or below a threshold of “acceptable” income, making the illicit
activities still worth the risk. Moreover, two other parallel effects might dominate
the relationships. More cash transfers can reduce willingness to work, increasing the
probability of involvement with illicit activities. It can also positively affect informality
to the detriment of formal labour, in the situations where the family would lose the
benefit otherwise. This could potentially put individuals in contact with people that
commit petty crimes affecting their probability of involvement in criminal activities.
It can also be argued that because individuals engaged in the criminal career have
lower costs to commit a crime, they are not affected by variations in their legal income
and a CCT programme would only influence the decision of individuals at the margin
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Inconsistency in the estimation of the effect of CCT on Crime
An alternative to estimate the effect of cash transfers on crime would be to omit
poverty rates from crime equation and take the endogeneity of the redistribution policy
and its direct effect on crime into account. 48 If this is the case, we use equation 1.2
and rewrite equation 1.3 as:
Crimeit = ψi + ωt + z
′
itβ + γLawit + δCCTit + εit (1.9)
where εit = ηPovit + ζit.
In order to analyse the bias that may stem from the inconsistency that emerges from
the estimation of equation 1.9, consider the variables in equation 1.2 net of xit and the
specific unobserved effects φi and λt denoted by a tilde49:
˜CCT it = θ ˜Povit + νit. (1.10)
A similar procedure for equation 1.9, but now net of ψi, ωt, Lawit and zit yields:
˜Crimeit = δ ˜CCT it + εit (1.11)
where εit = η ˜Povit + ξit.
Note that θ and δ, the parameters of interest, remain unchanged. The OLS estimator



















or in a more convenient matrix form:
δ̂ = ( ˜CCT
′ ˜CCT )−1( ˜CCT
′ ˜Crime). (1.13)
Plugging the matrix correspondent of equation 1.11, with respective error term, on
the previous expression results in:
48This analysis is based on Besley and Case (2000), that provides a more general analysis on
endogenous policies.
49Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem assures that the estimated parameters are identical.
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δ̂ − δ = η( ˜CCT ′ ˜CCT )−1( ˜CCT ′ ˜Pov) + ( ˜CCT ′ ˜CCT )−1( ˜CCT ′ξ) (1.14)
and using 1.10 and applying the probability limit, we get:
plim(δ̂ − δ) = plim
















where plims involving Pov and the error terms jointly are equal to zero, by
construction.









which depends on the observable poverty rate
that is very frequently omitted in the crime equation and the parameters that describe





, which is a function of the
unobserved omitted variables that determine both crime rates and the amount of
resources spent on cash transfers.
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1.A.2 Additional Tables
Table 1.7: Definition and Sources of Variables
Variable Description Source
Murder Murder Rate (100,000 inhabitants) SENASP
Homicide Homicide Rate (100,000 inhabitants) Health Ministry
Robbery Robbery Rate (100,000 inhabitants) SENASP
Theft Larceny Rate (100,000 inhabitants) SENASP
Kidnapping Kidnapping Rate (100,000 inhabitants) SENASP
Poverty People below poverty line (%) (IPEA) IPEA/PNAD
Extreme Poverty People below extreme poverty line (%) (IPEA) IPEA/PNAD
Gini Income Gini Coefficient IPEA/PNAD
Labour Income Mean Per capita Household Income from Labour IPEA/PNAD
(INPC corrected - R$ 2007)
Education Mean number of years of schooling IPEA/PNAD
(people aged 25 or more)
Young Male Percentage of male aged between 15 and 24 PNAD
in relation to all population
Unemployment Unemployment Rate PNAD
Parent Percentage of households with only one parent PNAD
(Female Headed)
Informality Informality degree in the labour market PNAD
(%)
Law Enforcement Per capita government expenditure STN
on law enforcement (INPC corrected - R$ 2007)
Cash Transfers Per capita government expenditure on Bolsa Familia MDS,
and Continuous Cash Benefit Portal
(INPC corrected - R$ 2007) da Transparência
Revenue Per capita Tax revenue of the States STN
(INPC corrected - R$ 2007)
Notes: All variables constructed by the author with data from the mentioned sources.
SENASP - Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública (National Secretariat of Public Security)
IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute of Applied Economic Research)
PNAD - Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domićılios (National Survey by Household Sampling)
STN - Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (National Treasury Secretariat)
TSE - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Supreme Electoral Court)
MDS - Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome
(Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication)
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Table 1.8: Selected variables for different levels in the implementation of Bolsa Familia (Perc. Var. in
CCT > Mean)
Whole Sample 2003-2004
Low Gap High Gap t-test Low Gap High Gap t-test
(Di = 1) (Di = 0) on diff. (Di = 1) (Di = 0) on diff.
Murder Rate 21.3008 24.7215 -0.85 20.1200 24.3625 -1.08
Homicide Rate (Health) 24.2891 29.7795 -1.27 23.4567 29.6574 -1.38
Robbery Rate 276.5995 460.9220 -1.87 287.0144 440.1256 -1.96
Theft Rate 969.9526 1276.5770 -1.11 1026.4530 1240.7560 -0.79
Kidnapping Rate 0.3380 0.3928 -0.58 0.3683 0.2501 0.88
Poverty Rate 0.3630 0.3374 0.42 0.4028 0.3784 0.38
Extreme Poverty Rate 0.1474 0.1296 0.54 0.1713 0.1569 0.36
Gini Index 0.5568 0.5505 0.51 0.5594 0.5570 0.19
Average Labour Income 671.8287 834.5558 -1.60 635.7222 796.4894 -1.64
Informality in the Labour Market 57.4600 54.3505 0.78 58.2300 54.9296 0.83
Single-Parent Households 0.2719 0.2886 -1.36 0.2725 0.2889 -1.27
Notes: High Gap and Low Gap as defined in equation 1.4 with the mean of percentage variation in CCT as the
threshold.
Data Sources: See Table 1.7.
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Table 1.9: Selected variables for different levels in the implementation of Bolsa Familia (Perc. Var. in
CCT > Median)
Whole Sample 2003-2004
Low Gap High Gap t-test Low Gap High Gap t-test
(Di = 1) (Di = 0) on diff. (Di = 1) (Di = 0) on diff.
Murder Rate 21.0835 24.6925 -0.90 19.7821 24.4000 -1.19
Homicide Rate (Health) 24.5064 29.1232 -1.06 23.6735 28.9469 -1.17
Robbery Rate 278.6980 446.3674 -1.66 290.0293 425.1010 -1.71
Theft Rate 932.3053 1296.7950 -1.44 969.8768 1285.1990 -1.19
Kidnapping Rate 0.3469 0.3789 -0.36 0.3597 0.2693 0.67
Poverty Rate 0.3589 0.3437 0.25 0.3982 0.3852 0.20
Extreme Poverty Rate 0.1448 0.1337 0.34 0.1682 0.1614 0.17
Gini Index 0.5542 0.5538 0.03 0.5575 0.5592 -0.13
Average Labour Income 668.8614 825.2339 -1.54 631.0525 789.1516 -1.62
Informality in the Labour Market 57.6327 54.4037 0.81 58.2441 55.1684 0.78
Single-Parent Households 0.2692 0.2903 -1.78 0.2721 0.2881 -1.25
Notes: High Gap and Low Gap as defined in equation 1.4 with the median of percentage variation in CCT as the
threshold.
Data Sources: See Table 1.7.
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Table 1.10: Effect of Poverty on the lag in the implementation
CCT perc. var. 04/08 CCT perc. var. 04/08 CCT perc. var. 03/04 CCT perc. var. 03/04




Constant 0.9251*** 0.8376*** 0.3849*** 0.4065***
(0.1326) (0.1128) (0.0382) (0.0363)
R2 0.0266 0.0209 0.4944 0.4623
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Sources: MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
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1.A.3 Additional Figures
(a) Poverty Rate (b) Cash Transfers
(c) Gap in CCT Variation
Figure 1.8: Poverty, Cash Transfers and lag in its variation in Brazil - 2004
Note: Classes based on quartiles. Data Sources : SENASP/MDS/IPEA/PNAD.
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Figure 1.9: Income Distribution 2003, 2004 and 2007 (R$ - 2007)





There is a significant gap between theory and empirical evidence about policies
to reduce crime rates. The majority of the theoretical analyses predict a sharp
decrease in crime rates when there are significant improvements in the economic
conditions, such as a fall in unemployment and poverty rates or when legal market
income has a significant increase. A similar prognosis is established in the case of a
substantial increase in the probability of punishment. However, a predominant part of
the empirical literature in the economics of crime observe a lower than expected
effect on crime rates from exogenous variations in economic variables.1
This chapter argues that a possible reason for this is the fact that the current
literature of economics of crime overlooks a likely hysteresis effect in the criminal
behaviour, a situation in which, ceteris paribus, individuals that have a criminal past
are more prone to take crime opportunities than someone that has never committed
one, if the original conditions are subsequently restored, a subset of these agents will
continue in their career in crime. As it will be discussed below, a relevant
consequence of hysteresis in criminal behaviour is the fact that social policies to
reduce crime will have a more important impact on potential criminals than on
existing criminals, which is a more realistic representation of criminal decision, where
the current crime decision of individuals are influenced by their previous choices.
Most of the theory treats potential and existing criminals as having the same
propensity to commit a crime.2 That is a very restrictive assumption. As it will be
1Freeman (1999), Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008) and Mustard (2010) show the great
discrepancy between economic theory and empirical evidence.
2The few exceptions are given by Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004), Mocan, Billups, and
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discussed in this chapter, when potential and existing criminals are treated differently,
contrasting conclusions are reached in terms of crime reduction policies.
If hysteresis is present in the criminal behavior, crime reduction policies will have
a diminished impact when compared to the expected impact where individuals with
a criminal past will behave similarly to individuals without a criminal past. That
asymmetric effect will be very clear in a situation in which the crime reduction policy
in a given period is simply a reversal of a deterioration of one determinant of crime.
A concrete example would be a situation where part of the police officers in a city are
dismissed in a given year, resulting in a escalation in crime. If all sacked police officers
are readmitted in the following year in an attempt to restore the original crime levels
and hysteresis is present in the criminal behavior, that policy will result in a lower
crime rate, but higher than the original one.
I will show that depending on whether one assumes homogeneity or heterogeneity
of agents with respect to their intrinsic costs of crime, two distinct types of hysteresis
will arise.3 In this chapter, I will refer to weak hysteresis as a phenomenon that occurs
at the individual level only if specific threshold levels are surpassed. As it will be
seen in the next sections, if the individuals are assumed to be homogeneous and their
decisions are aggregated, that type of hysteresis also occur in the aggregate level.
However, as it will be shown, with heterogeneous agents, the aggregate variation is
reinforced generating a strong hysteresis effect. At every level of the input variable,
positive variations result in different effects on the output variable when compared to
effects from negative variations. Furthermore, as it will be seen in the next sections,
unlike the situation of weak hysteresis, the amplitude of the remanence will depend on
the magnitude of the shock.
I claim that there are two types of sources of hysteresis in crime: 1. External to
the individuals (extrinsic). Weak hysteresis with this source has recently been
considered in the literature by introducing social stigma into the labour market:
Lower wage offers (Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004)); higher duration in
unemployment (Engelhardt (2010)); social capital depreciation (Sickles and Williams
(2008)). Hysteresis would only be a result in this context in the situations where the
criminal is caught and convicted and/or this fact is known by the others individuals in
his social life. Nevertheless, data on countries like the US and the UK show that the
punishment for the majority of committed crimes do not involve incarceration and the
Overland (2005), Sickles and Williams (2008), Santos (2009) and Engelhardt (2010). However,
as it will be shown, they all assume specific types of non-stationarity associated to stigma in the
labour market or human capital accumulation.
3This should not be confused with others uses of the term hysteresis in economics.
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apprehension rate is very low.4
2. Internal to the individuals (intrinsic). The claim in this paper is that hysteresis
could also occur as a result of sources internal to the individuals. As it will be shown
in the following sections, sunk moral cost (fallacy) and learning in crime can lock in-
dividuals in the criminal career. Internal sources are crucial to an explicit characterisa-
tion of strong hysteresis in criminal choice.
This chapter argues that stigma in the labour market is only one of the sources
of hysteresis in criminal behaviour5 and a more relevant explanation of hysteresis
stems from internal sources to the individual. To date and to my knowledge, there has
been no formal model or empirical study on internal hysteresis in criminal behaviour.
It is also the first work to place hysteresis at the heart of the analysis of criminal
behaviour.6 Moreover, this is the first effort to embed hysteresis (intrinsic or extrinsic)
in an equilibrium search model.
In the following section, I discuss the related literature in hysteresis and crime. The
relevance of hysteresis in criminal decisions is discussed in section 2.3. A benchmark
framework is established in section 2.4, while I develop a non-stationary model to show
the hysteresis effect in sections 2.5 and 2.6. In section 2.7, I analyse the consequences
of hysteresis in the case of forward-looking agents. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Hysteresis in Economics
Hysteresis has been a phenomenon identified in economic contexts like foreign
investment (Dixit (1989, 1992)) and unemployment (Blanchard and Summers (1987)
and Røed (2002)).7 However, the use of the word hysteresis is not consistent in
economics and it often used as a synonym to persistence.
Cross (1993) and Amable, Henry, Lordon, and Topol (1994) formally define
hysteresis in the economic context, showing the difference between its weak and
4In some cities of the US and the UK, the clearance rate - crimes with a charge being laid
divided by the total number of crimes recorded - is as low as 5%. Nationwide the fraction of
cleared crimes varies between 1/5 and 1/4. See FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) website
for data on the US and the Home Office Statistical Bulletin for information about clearance
rates in the UK.
5I provide a detailed review of that literature in the next section.
6Note that hysteresis is not necessarily the term used in the existing literature, nor is
hysteresis the main focus in those papers.
7For a more recent exposition of the use of the concept of hysteresis in economics see Göcke
(2002).
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strong versions. It is pointed out the usual improper use of the word in economics to
describe persistence stemming from unit root for discrete processes or zero
eigenvalue for linear dynamic systems.
Amable, Henry, Lordon, and Topol (1994) let clear that a shock exerted on a state
variable in a unit root process will lead to a new steady state, but will keep the number
of equilibria and its respective locus unchanged. If crime rates are unit root processes,
two opposite shocks with the same magnitude will leave the crime rate unaffected,
whereas in a hysteric system they will lead the crime rate to a new equilibrium. In a
system with hysteresis, the current behaviour depends on the dominant extremum of
past shocks, whereas in a system with unit root, all past shocks matter. That implies
that hysteresis is associated to local structural stability, whereas unit root processes are
associated to global structural stability.
Unlike unit/zero root processes, both types of hysteresis display path dependence,
asymmetric effects from the determinant variables and the remanence property. In the
context of crime, remanence corresponds to crime rates not going back to its original
value when the probability of punishment or the average legal wage is transitorily
changed.
2.2.2 Crime Decision in Economics
Since the seminal paper of Becker (1968), economists consider formally the
possible effects of socioeconomic variables on criminal behaviour. The standard fully
rational crime decision model establishes that an individual periodically faces a
decision whether to commit an illicit act or not, based on the expected return of the
criminal market and associated probability and severity of punishment when
compared to the expected stream of legal income.8
Just recently the economics of crime has formally considered the inherent
intertemporal nature of criminal choice.9 McCrary (2010) highlights the importance
of considering a dynamic setting in order to properly describe the choice of a potential
criminal. Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004) develop an on-the-job search
model to analyse the interrelations between crime, unemployment and inequality. The
authors find multiple equilibria, which suggest there is a hysteresis process in crime
8Stigler (1970), Ehrlich (1973) and Heineke and Block (1975) contributed to establish the
economics of crime literature. Another relevant paper that applied Becker’s paradigm in a
purely economic law-breaking decision making was Allingham and Sandmo (1972) that proposed
a model for tax evasion. Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2007) provide thorough
reviews of the models of optimal law enforcement.
9See McCrary (2010) for a extensive survey on dynamic models in the economics of crime
literature.
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decisions. The result helps to understand why higher levels of welfare benefits could
lead to higher crime rates as higher taxes could discourage some individuals to work.
Other relevant articles with dynamic settings are Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert
(2004), Imai and Krishna (2004), Lochner (2004), Engelhardt, Rocheteau, and Rupert
(2008), Sickles and Williams (2008) and Engelhardt (2010).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that even though the criminal decision takes place
in a dynamic environment, especially regarding the future net stream of income in the
legal market, that is not necessarily taken into account for individuals at the margin.
Akerlof (1991) argues that any analysis that considers potential criminals evaluating
all periods in the future is based on an unreasonable assumption.10 The individual at
the margin would be likely, in most cases, to be very myopic. Another ubiquitous
questionable assumption in the dynamic models to describe the crime decision is that
once the illicit option is chosen, the probabilities of an individual choosing the possible
alternatives remain unaltered in the following period.
There are different reasons why hysteresis arises in the criminal choice. These
sources can be classified into two groups: external to the individual (extrinsic) and
internal to the individual (intrinsic). The main source of external hysteresis stems from
the stigma in the labour market. Individuals with criminal records would have a higher
duration in unemployment or lower wage offers. A more comprehensive source of
external hysteresis is the depreciation of social capital. There are at least three sources
of hysteresis internal to the individual that emerge in the criminal choice: sunk moral
costs of the criminal activity, overly optimistic bias and criminal technology learning.
It is important to distinguish hysteresis in crime from recidivism, which has a
specific literature, that is mostly empirical.11 The studies on this topic focus on
measuring the “treatment effect” of imprisonment and the duration before an
individual commits a crime again once he/she is released from prison. While
hysteresis emerges from the analysis of a situation in which the probability of
committing a crime is higher if a crime was committed in the past, recidivism consists
in a subset, since it focuses only on caught/arrested, and crucially, convicted
individuals. More specifically, in a recidivism analysis, criminals that were never
arrested and convicted will not be considered. It also deals with an intrinsic missing
data problem, as the researcher does not necessarily observe all individuals that
committed a crime again, since this observation depends on a new capture.12 Another
10I thank Vasileios Vlaseros for making me aware of this paper.
11Recent studies are given by Bierens and Carvalho (2011), Carvalho (2009), Bierens and
Carvalho (2007), Bowles and Florackis (2007), Freeman (2003) and Escarela, Francis, and
Soothill (2000).
12Another relevant issue to be dealt with is right-censoring, as nothing prevents the ex-inmate
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important difference lies in the fact that a significant part of crimes do not result in
imprisonment, even if the offender is caught.13 The punishments for these types of
crimes are usually fines or community sentences. In most countries, sanctions that do
not involve captivity are the most common punishment.14 More importantly, the
recidivism literature does not provide a full-fledged theoretical decision model.
One important source of hysteresis, is the social stigma that the criminal career
entails and crucially results in additional frictions in the labour market. In this vein,
Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) embedded stigma in the labour market, in the
sense that a criminal record reduces their legal earnings. In a model with heterogeneous
agents with respect to their income-earning ability, the existence of stigma results in
a lower amount of juvenile delinquency and a higher amount of recidivism of older
agents. It must be noted, however, that stigma in the model described above does not
imply frictions in the labour market (or from a criminal career).
Freeman (1991) suggests that stigma affects the unemployment duration more
significantly than it does on the decreases in wages. This is considered by Santos
(2009), that embeds a Markov chain in a general equilibrium model in order to
introduce a lower probability of getting a job for individuals with a criminal history. It
concludes that harsher stigmatisation in the labour market implies lower crime rates
(because agents are forward-looking) and a higher rate of recidivism. Similar
conclusions are reached by Engelhardt (2010), as the author considers a search model
of crime that incorporates heterogeneous agents with respect to their evaluations of
leisure.15 Using a time allocation framework, where time can be spent on three
possible activities, namely, legitimate work, leisure and income producing crime and
individuals accumulate social capital, Sickles and Williams (2008) concludes that the
depreciation of this type of capital reduces the employability of individuals with
criminal history. Mocan, Billups, and Overland (2005) also develop a formal model
with similar aspects and find that individuals fall in a crime trap during a recession
due to simultaneous depreciation of legal human capital and appreciation of criminal
human capital. Empirical evidence is given in this direction by Imai and Krishna
(2004), Buonanno, Montolio, and Vanin (2009), Mocan and Bali (2010) and
to commit a crime after the period of the collected data.
13The great majority of recidivism articles analyse individuals after they are released from
prison, but there is also a recidivism literature that focus on petty crimes.
14The fraction of sentences involving confinement is approximately 5% in the UK and the US.
See Sentencing Statistics - UK Ministry of Justice and US Sentencing Commission.
15Which implies heterogeneity in reservation wages in the legal sector. Worker heterogeneity
is crucial to account for individual employment histories, especially the fact that hazard rates
tend to decrease with the length of unemployment spell. (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005))
Additionally, it allows the model to explain why some individuals do not engage in crime.
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Engelhardt (2010).
Criminal Interactions and Multiplicity of Equilibria
Sah (1991) was the first author to argue that criminal rates exhibit inertia. People
estimate the actual probability of being punished by observing their peers,
incorporating present and past information in their inferences generating inertia.
Therefore, a reduction in the actual probability of being punished will have only a
limited effect on peoples inferences and consequently on the current criminal rate in
the short run. This inertia would lead to multiple steady states. However, there is no
multiplicity of equilibria, as “there are no agents in the economy who can or wish to
eliminate period-to-period changes.” [Sah (1991)]
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) develop a model of networks where ex ante
homogenous criminals compete with each other but benefit from being friends with
other criminals by learning about the crime business. In a game in which individuals
decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if
criminals, the authors show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active
criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven
by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals. Similar conclusions
are reached by Calvó-Armengol, Verdier, and Zenou (2007) in a model where non-
criminal interact with criminals.
Bjerk (2010) develops a model analyzing how criminal behavior is associated with
individual and neighborhood poverty. The model shows that even under relatively
minimal assumptions, a connection between individual poverty and both property and
violent crimes will arise, and moreover, neighborhood effects can develop, but will
differ substantially in nature across crime types. A key implication is that greater
economic segregation in a city should have no effect or a negative effect on property
crime, but a positive effect on violent crime.
Multiple equilibria is also a result when the effect that level of crime c can have
on the probability of punishment π is considered. Fender (1999) presents a general
equilibrium model with this feature discussing the cases in which multiple equilibria
may arise. In Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) multiple equilibria occurs when the authors
consider not only the potential effect of c on π, but also the effect of c on s in an
economy with risk-neutral agents. Using a different approach Kim (2012) get to similar
conclusions. Ferrer (2010) analyses a model that explicitly takes into account the fact
that the probability of punishment decreases with the total number of individuals in the
criminal career in a society, implying multiple equilibria.
55
2.3 Stationarity in the Criminal Decision and Hysteresis
A crucial aspect of the dynamic economic models of criminal decision with a
stochastic environment16 is that, regardless of whether the illicit action in period t is
taken or not, the probability of committing a crime in t + 1 remains unchanged. This
is the assumption of stationarity, which assumes that the individual’s perception of the
future is independent of time or the duration of the criminal career.
Let θt be the propensity to commit a specific crime in a given period t. For a given
probability of punishment, at any period t, an individual commit a crime if the utility
associated to θt is larger than the one obtained from a threshold θ∗t . The crime decision
in two consecutive periods can then be depicted in a general fashion as in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Crime Decision
For a given propensity to commit a crime and a probability of punishment, the






16Stochastic transitions between states is a necessary assumption not only in order to account
for hysteresis, but to allow the individual to determine a contingency plan. Models with
deterministic transitions will lead to a situation where the decision makers pick a sequence of
actions a priori, leaving them without any flexibility given the realised states.
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However, it is reasonable to argue that depending on the choice and the response
of the environment, the individuals reevaluate their choices. Being caught will reduce
the propensity of individual below the previous propensity and getting away with the
illicit act will increase the original propensity. That specific non-stationary case arise






In the case where condition 2.2 holds, figure 2.1 represents a non-stationary
Markov process and must hold to the different types of crime. However, it can be
argued that for types of crime where punishment entails incarceration, the net effect is
ambiguous as the propensity to violate the norm will not necessarily decrease. Indeed,
individuals can become more inclined to commit crimes due to social stigma and
criminal learning in prison, increasing the probability of recidivism.17 One way to
circumvent this would be to focus on petty crimes, where the punishment usually
involves a fine, rather than incarceration.
The propensity to break the law is inherently a latent variable and it can be
captured in many different ways depending on the theoretical framework. A concrete
situation would be an environment where individuals instead of observing the
probability of punishment, they only observe a noisy signal correlated to the true
probability of punishment and update their priors according to previous experience. If
they are caught, they update their probability punishment estimates downwards, and
upwards otherwise.
Another possibility where the crime decision is non-stationary occurs if all criminal
acts entail an intrinsic cost, borne irrespective of whether the punishment occurs or not.
If that cost is a decreasing function of criminal history, the relationship between the






In what follows, I will focus on a less abstract concept where the decision to
commit a crime is determined by individuals comparing the probability of punishment
and relevant economic variables to their corresponding thresholds.
17There is some evidence that time spent in the conventional jail increase the probability of
recidivism. See Carvalho (2009) and Escarela, Francis, and Soothill (2000).
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2.3.1 Hysteresis in the Individual and Aggregate Levels
If the crime decision in a given period is determined not only by the current
expected costs and benefits entailed by the illicit act, but it is also affected by criminal
decisions taken in the past, hysteresis at the individual level will arise. I will follow the
hysteresis literature and label that type of phenomenon as weak hysteresis.
Figure 2.2 depicts the concept of weak hysteresis in the context of crime decision
for variations in the probability of punishment. A sufficiently low probability of
punishment (π < π̄Entry) will encourage an individual to commit a crime18
(φ(π) = 1), whereas a sufficiently high probability of punishment (π ≥ π̄Exit) will
unambiguously deter an illicit act. However, as it will be shown in this chapter, for
one specific level of the probability of punishment between the two thresholds








Figure 2.2: Weak Hysteresis - Individual Level
If the previous levels of π were all above π̄Entry, a situation in which π̄Entry ≤ π <
π̄Exit will always result in no criminal acts. However, if at least one of the past values
of π was below π̄Entry, a π in the region π̄Entry ≤ π < π̄Exit will always result in
crime.
The aggregation of homogenous agents subject to hysteresis also displays the weak
hysteresis effect and the pattern of hysteresis is similar to the individual level. However,
with heterogeneous agents the aggregate variation is reinforced, since there will several
different thresholds, generating a strong hysteresis effect. At every level of the input
18I assume that an individual faced with indifference will always abstain from crime.
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variable, positive variations result in different effects on the output variable when
compared to effects from negative variations.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the effect of a temporary reduction in the probability of
punishment π on crime rates in a system with strong hysteresis. Initially there is an
increase in the crime rate from c0 to c1 as a consequence of a fall in the probability of
punishment from π0 to π1. However, as it will be shown in the next sections, if the
probability of punishment is restored to its previous level from π1 to π0, the crime rate
falls, but it does not return to its original level, but to a higher level c2 > c0.
The difference between c2 and c0 is a measure of the remanence in crime rates
associated to all additional individuals that are not deterred from crime at π = π0 after
the temporary fall in π, even though the same individuals were not criminals at π = π0













Figure 2.3: Strong Hysteresis - Aggregate level
Decrease in the probability of punishment π followed by an increase to its original
In the model that I develop in the next sections, I will focus on a less abstract
concept where the decision to commit a crime is determined by individuals comparing





There is a [0, 1] continuum of ex ante homogenous19 risk-neutral20 myopic
infinitely-lived individuals that decide whether to commit a crime or not. For sake of
simplicity, I also assume that breaking the law is a victimless act. The wage of
individuals abiding by the law is drawn from an exogenous distribution F (w).
Committing a crime can increase utility by the illicit (pecuniary and/or nonpecuniary)
gain g, but it also entails a moral (or intrinsic) cost m and an exogenous21 probability
π 22 of facing a punishment s (sanction). The trade-off between the time spent in legal
and criminal activities is captured by a reduction in w by γ ∈ [0, 1].23 The
introduction of the parameter γ relaxes the assumptions present in all previous models
in the economics of crime that either the law breakers have to entirely forfeit a legal
income or not at all. As it will be seen, that parameter plays a key role in the crime
decision.
Every criminal act entails an intrinsic cost m which is borne irrespective of
whether the punishment occurs or not. This cost can have at least two non-mutually
exclusive interpretations: 1. A moral cost associated with an illicit activity, either a
disutility because the individuals feel guilt about the harm caused to the victim by the
act (internal) or the disapproval of their peers (social). 2. The actual cost of a criminal
act (entry fee or criminal technology/inputs) which is decreasing with the number of
crimes committed in the past (individual learning) and/or with the number/strength of
links in a criminal network (social learning).
The expected utility of crime (EUC) is then given by:
EUC = (g + γw −m− s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
caught
π + (g + γw −m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
get away with it
(1− π)
= g + γw −m− sπ
(2.4)
19The assumption of homogeneity will relaxed afterwards and is assumed to show that the
results are not driven by ex ante heterogeneity.
20This assumption keeps the tractability of the model, not in detriment of the qualitative
results.
21As it will be discussed in chapter 3, that is a reasonable assumption in the short run.
22The probability of punishment (fine, prison, etc) is conditional on conviction, which is itself
conditional on being caught/arrested. Here it is assumed that being caught implies conviction
and punishment.
23(1− γ) can be interpreted as the depreciation of the ability to earn w when and individual
is engaged in crime. This reduction in w reflects stigma in the labour market and/or less time
available to work in legal activities.
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At every period t, agents choose to engage in criminal activity φ = 1 or not φ = 0.
An agent will choose to engage in criminal activity if the expected gains of committing
in crime outweigh the income without crime.
This decision is determined by:
Maxφ{w,EUC} (2.5)
that boils down to:
φ =
{
1 if g − (1− γ)w −m− sπ > 0
0 otherwise
(2.6)
Notice from equation 2.6 that if there is no conflict between legal and criminal
activities (γ = 1) the crime decision will not depend on w. Conversely, if γ = 0,
crime and no crime are two mutually exclusive activities and consequently different
states. That implies that γ is closer to 0 for more serious crimes and closer to 1 for
petty crimes.
It should also be noted that in the extreme case where π = 0 and there is no
opportunity cost (γ = 1), crime only happens if the gain associated to the act is strictly
higher than the intrinsic cost: g > m.
Definition 2.1. For a given combination (g,m,w, s), there is a unique π, the
deterrent threshold of punishment, that will deter all individuals from crime:
π̄D =
g − (1− γ)w −m
s
(2.7)
Definition 2.2. For a given combination (g,m, π, s), there is a unique w, the





Under homogeneity of the agents and assuming that each criminal commits only
one type of crime per period, 24 the crime rates can be depicted for a given π̄D and w̄D,
respectively.
24This a reasonable assumption for a sufficiently short period. In the case of a longer period,
the crime rate is obtained by also taking into account the distribution of the number of crimes
each criminal commits per period. A simple formulation is to assume that the number of crimes
of each criminal is given by a uniform probability mass function. If an additional assumption
that all individuals commit the same number of crimes q > 1 is made, the crime rate can be
obtained simply by multiplying the fraction of offenders by q. Note that in that case the crime













Figure 2.4: Crime Rates for Homogenous Agents
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Agents
Heterogeneity allows for a more realistic description of the relationship between


















Figure 2.5: Crime Rates for Heterogeneous Agents (K = 2)
Let the individuals to vary with respect to their moral cost mj , j = {1, ..., K}.
25What follows is based on exogenous ex ante heterogeneity. An analysis with ex ante
homogeneity, but ex post heterogeneity will lead to similar results. It can be carried out if I
assume that individuals instead of observing the probability of punishment, they only observe a
noisy signal correlated to the true probability of punishment and update their priors according
to previous experience. Sah (1991), Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) and Calvó-Armengol,
Verdier, and Zenou (2007) provided the first models were agents have an imperfect observation
of the probability of punishment. Empirical evidence in this direction is given by Rincke and
Traxler (2011).
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(K types). For K=2, m is either mL or mH with probability (α, 1 − α). For a given







. Similarly, for a given combination (g,mj, π, s), there are two







For a continuum of types, mj can be represented by a distribution fm(m). The
simplest non-trivial case is when the fraction of each type is equally likely and m
follows a uniform distribution: m ∼ U(mmin,mmax). For a given positive (negative)
variation in π there is a negative (positive) variation in the crime rate correspondent to
the fraction of the population with the level of m.26
The values of mmin and mmax can be normalised so that π̄D ∼ U(0, 1): πDmin =
0 = g−(1−γ)w−mmax
s




mmin = g − (1− γ)w − s.




, mmin ≤ m ≤ mmin + s. (2.9)
Similarly for w, for a given positive (negative) variation in w, there is a negative
(positive) variation in the crime rate correspondent to the fraction of the population




, mmin ≤ m ≤ mmin + 1− γ. (2.10)
Because π̄D has pdf given by: fπ̄D(π̄D) = 1, 0 ≤ π̄D ≤ 1, for a given π, crime









dπ̄D = 1− π (2.11)
The first integral in equation 2.11 corresponds to the aggregation of all individuals
with moral cost below the moral cost associated to the prevailing probability of
punishment π. That is equivalent to the deterrence probability of punishment π̄D
being greater than π, given by the second integral of the equation.
Similarly for w, w̄D has pdf given by: fw̄D(w̄D) = 1w̄max , 0 ≤ w̄
D ≤ w̄max, for a
given w, crime rate is given by:
26Notice that if the highest level of m is sufficiently high, c < 1 even if π = 0.
27The same result is obtained by applying the theorem of inverse transformation of random
variables to the affine transformation m = g − (1− γ)w − sπ̄D.












dw̄D = 1− w
w̄max
(2.12)
Equation 2.12 corresponds to the aggregation of all individuals with moral cost
below the moral cost associated to the prevailing legal wage w, or equivalently, the
aggregation of all individuals with reservation wage of crime w̄D greater than w.
The crime rates in terms of probability of punishment π and legal wage w are











Figure 2.6: Crime Rates for a Continuum of Heterogeneous Agents - Uniform
A more realistic representation of the distribution of the intrinsic cost would relax
the assumption of equally likely values of m. For simplicity, assume mmin = 0, so
that fm(m) has a support on the [0,mmax] interval. Crime rate in terms of π can then






= Fm(g − (1− γ)w − sπ)
(2.13)
As the cdf Fm in non-decreasing, equation 2.13 in a non-linear decreasing function
on π. This is also true to w, as it can be analogously shown. Figures 2.7a and 2.7b
depict these relationships for a log-normal distribution.29
Notice that for extreme high values of π and w, crime rates are lower than the case
that the intrinsic cost has a uniform distribution. Similarly, extreme low values of π
and w are associated to higher crime rates than the uniform case.











Figure 2.7: Crime Rates for a Continuum of Heterogeneous Agents - Log-normal
2.5 Homogeneous Agents and Weak Hysteresis
Consider the previous framework and define criminal history at time t as the sum





All variables associated with the crime decision could potentially be affected by
criminal history. The intrinsic cost m and the opportunity cost of crime given by
(1 − γ)w are unambiguously decreasing in ht, as was discussed in previous sections.
The gain from crime g is increasing in ht, as crime experience and networking allows
a better targeting at loot with higher values. The severity of punishment s is also
increasing in ht, as most countries impose heftier sanctions for individuals with a
criminal past. The effect of ht on the probability of punishment π depends on whether
the learning process dominates the higher number of traces left by the criminal acts.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the variables above only depend whether an
individual has ever committed a crime or not. Define the binary variable h = 1[ht−1 ≥
1], where 1[·] is an indicator function. This assumption will subsequently be relaxed.
As all variables above, apart from s and π, increase the propensity of committing
a crime given h = 1, the positive effect of crime history on crime choice (including
any reduction in π through learning) can be encapsulated by m. The negative effect of
h on crime choice (including any increase in π given the higher number of traces) is
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subsumed in s. A simple linear specification30 is then given by:
mt = m̄− m̃h (2.15)
st = s̄+ s̃$h (2.16)
where $ ∈ [0, 1] captures the fact that only a fraction of the criminal past is known
by the judicial system.
Using the equations above, equations 2.4 and 2.6 can be rewritten respectively as:




1 if g − (1− γ)w − m̄− s̄π + (m̃−$s̃π)h > 0
0 otherwise
(2.18)
Solving equation 2.18 for π yields the deterrent threshold of punishment π̄D:
π̄D =
g − (1− γ)w − m̄+ m̃h
s̄+$s̃h
(2.19)
And the reservation wage of crime w̄D:
w̄D =
g − m̄− s̄π + (m̃−$s̃π)h
1− γ
(2.20)
Then equation 2.18 can be rewritten as:
φt(π) =
{






1 if w < w̄D
0 otherwise
(2.22)
Therefore, the deterrent threshold of punishment and the crime reservation wages
are functions of the criminal history.
It is clear from equation 2.20 that w̄D is increasing in criminal history h if and only
if
m̃ > $s̃π. (2.23)
30A exponential specification (m̄e−m̃h and s̄es̃$h) will lead to similar results.
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And as shown in the appendix, π̄D is increasing in h if
m̃ > $s̃, (2.24)
in addition to the assumption that the part of sanction that does not depend on the
known criminal past is proportional to the net gain of crime (s̄ = ḡ).31
Because 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, the latter condition implies the former. Condition 2.24 is a
reasonable assumption as only the convicted past crimes should increase the severity of
punishment, whereas all past crimes should affect the intrinsic cost of crime ($ < 1).
In what follows, it is assumed that condition 2.24 holds, and without loss of generality
under this assumption, I consider the simplest case where this is true by setting s̃ = 0.
Additionally, the focus of the analysis in the remaining of this section will be on
the probability of punishment π, as the results for wages are analogous. The following
proposition establishes weak hysteresis in the criminal decision:
Proposition 2.1. Weak Hysteresis If individuals are homogeneous and maxi-
mize expected utility, their intrinsic cost of crime m evolves according to equation
(2.15), with criminal history h = {0, 1} and defining ḡ ≡ g − m̄− (1− γ)w, for




1 if π < ḡ
s















1 if π < ḡ
s




Proof. Note that regardless of whether or not individuals have committed crime
in the past, they will always commit a crime in period t if π < ḡ
s
(entry threshold)




(exit threshold). However, if






, the decision is conditional on the crime choice in the
previous period. As h = {0, 1}, the range of decision described in 2.21 can be
partitioned into 3 regions, and for any π, the crime decision is given by equations
2.25 and 2.26. 
31This is a consequence of the proportionality principle, observed by criminal justice system
in most countries, by which the harshness of the penalty for each offense is proportional to the













Figure 2.8: Crime Rates for Homogenous Agents - Weak Hysteresis
Equations 2.25 and 2.26 together represent a relay function, where the choice in
period t is state-dependent.
At this point it is clear that there are two main aspects that determine the degree of
hysteresis in crime decision. One is the degree of memory in the criminal history and
the other is the size of m̃ relative to the severity of punishment. In the extreme cases
where m̃ is very high or all criminal history matters, there is a ratchet effect where
criminals are locked-in.
It is useful to have a new notation for the different levels of deterrent thresholds of
punishment π̄D. Denote the entry threshold by π̄E and the threshold that individuals
leave the criminal career by π̄L. Therefore π̄E = ḡ
s





If individuals are homogeneous the aggregation of individual crime decision into
crime rates is trivial. The relationship between π and crime rates is depicted in figure
2.8.
It is clear that hysteresis is a phenomenon that occurs at the individual level only
if specific threshold levels are reached. Hysteresis does not happen if individuals face
probability of punishment and legal wages far from the critical thresholds. That is one
of the main characteristics of weak hysteresis.
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2.5.1 Weak Hysteresis versus Unit Root Process
If criminal history in the last T periods matter, the exit deterrent threshold of










and the range of the relay function will have T + 1 partitions.
The deterrent threshold of punishment can return to the original level π̄E = ḡ
s
if
individuals do not commit crimes for T periods.
It is important to contrast the history dependence that stems from this relay function
with history dependence that emerges from a unit root in a discrete process.
If all criminal history is relevant, the deterrent threshold of punishment is non-










Note that equation 2.28 is the steady state level of π̄Lt following an AR(1) process











As a unit root process has a impulse-response function constant and equal to one,
any temporary shock has a permanent effect. A shock in this setting is extremely
simple and corresponds to m̃
s
φt switching from 0 to m̃s or vice versa.
Unlike this unit root discrete process, where current behaviour depends weakly
on all past shocks, in a hysteric process, current behaviour strongly depends only on
non-dominated extrema of past shocks.
32Another way to see this is to notice that equation 2.28 is a MA(∞), which is equivalent to
an AR(1).
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2.6 Heterogeneous Agents and Strong Hysteresis
For 2 types of agents, the different exit and entry thresholds occur in both levels


























Figure 2.9: Crime Rates for Heterogeneous Agents (K = 2) - Weak Hysteresis
For a continuum of heterogeneous agents, I proceed as in the previous section,
where the intrinsic cost of crime follow a uniform distribution, but with the bounds
taking into account the reduced intrinsic costs for individuals with criminal history:
m̄ ∼ U(m̄min, m̄max), with m̄max = g− (1− γ)w+ m̃ and m̄min = g− (1− γ)w− s.






















dπ̄D = 1− s
s+ m̃h
π (2.31)







dw̄D = 1− s
sw̄max + m̃h
w (2.32)
If there was crime in the past, present crime rate is less sensitive to the impact of
policies affecting π and w when compared to the situation where there is no crime in
the past.
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As seen above, by relaxing the assumption of a equally likely distribution of intrin-
sic cost of crime m, there is a non-linear relationship between crime, π and w.
I formally define some concepts related to hysteresis in crime rates in terms of the
probability of punishment π and summarize the results in two propositions.
Definition 2.3. Let Ω be the criminal remanence, the increase in the crime rate
when π returns to its original level π0.
Definition 2.4. Let πC be the coercive probability of punishment, the level of π
necessary to return the crime rate to its original level.
Definition 2.5. Let ξ = πC − π0 be the coercive force necessary to return the
crime rate to its original level.
Definition 2.6. Let H(πt) be the maximum historical crime rate in the last T
periods:
H(πt) = max{c(πt−T ), ..., c(πt−1)}.
Consider the situation set choice of the policy maker deciding the level of the
probability of punishment is simply: {πH , πL}, with πH > πL.
Proposition 2.2. Strong Hysteresis If individuals are heterogeneous with
respect to their initial intrinsic cost of crime m̄ and the intrinsic cost of crime
evolves according to equation 2.15, for any two levels of probability of punishment
πL < πH ∈ [0, 1], an exogenous reduction in π from πH to πL (∆−π) will increase
crime by ∆+c. If it is followed by an exogenous increase in π from πL to πH
(∆+π = −∆−π), it will decrease crime by ∆−c = −∆+c+ Ω, where
Ω = Fm̄(g − (1− γ)w − s̃π + m̃ H(πL))− Fm̄(g − (1− γ)w − s̃π + m̃ H(πH)).33
Proof. Proof in the appendix. 
Corollary 2.1. For any given combination of the parameters of the model, as the
the probability of the punishment π → 0 or π → 1, both the criminal remanence
Ω→ 0 and the coercive force ξ → 0.
Proof. Direct result from the fact that Fm̄ is a CDF. 
33Proof of this theorem arose from joint work with Vasileios Vlaseros.
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Corollary 2.1 states that the remanence effect Ω is close to 0 when π are close to
their lower and upper bounds.
Proposition 2.3. If the level of severity s is sufficiently high, both the criminal
remanence Ω→ 0 and the coercive force ξ → 0 .
Proof. This is a direct result from equations 2.60 and 2.61, and the fact that Fm̄
is a CDF. 
The result established in proposition 2.3 is very intuitive since there is a trade-off
between severity and probability of punishment. However, increasing the latter
involves the allocation of resources to costly monitoring and undesirable risk of
punishing an innocent person (type II error). That would imply setting the probability
of punishment as low as possible and the severity of punishment as high as possible.
However, the harshness of the penalty for each offense cannot be increased beyond
the level that the society considers a fair punishment (proportionality principle) or in
case of a pecuniary punishment beyond the ability of the lawbreaker to pay the fine.
Besides, the process of punishment (apprehension, prosecution and actual
punishment) entails significant costs as well. For that reason, a crime minimising
policy must balance these two variables.
Example
As an example and without loss of generality,34 assume that m follows a log-normal








ln(g − (1− γ)w − sπ)− µ√
2σ2
] (2.33)







From the equation 2.15 describing the effect of criminal history on intrinsic costm,
it is clear that the mean and the variance of m can be written respectively as:
E(m) = E(m̄)− m̃E(h) (2.34)
var(m) = var(m̄) + m̃2var(h) (2.35)
It is clear that a higher proportion of individuals with criminal record decreases the
mean and increases the variance of m. That is translated in a shift of fm(m) to the left.
34Similar results with several other distributions.
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That implies that the curve given by equation 2.33 is displaced to the right, as show




















Figure 2.10: Crime Rates for different levels of π and w
The thick lines illustrate the full variation of π or w between 0 and 1 in both
directions. If π is exogenously reduced from π0 to π1, crime rate goes up from c0
to c1. If π is restored to its original value π0, crime rate falls to c2 = c0 + Ω. Only if
π is increased to π2 will make the crime rate to return to its original level c0. A similar
explanation applies to variations in w. For this smaller range of variation in π or w,
there is a smaller loop inside the one plotted in both figures.
It is also clear from the figure 2.10 that ex ante heterogeneity leads to hysteresis
at every point of the input variable, instead of trigger thresholds in the case of weak
hysteresis when agents are homogeneous.
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2.7 Forward-Looking Agents with Search
In the previous sections, it was implicitly assumed that at every period, individuals
deciding whether to commit a crime or not, would have a crime opportunity and a
legal wage with probability one. It was also assumed that individuals are myopic with
respect with the costs and benefits of committing a crime.
Using the concepts developed in the benchmark above, I present in this section a
more general view, where individuals are forward-looking and search for economic
activities, taking into account the net expected present value of income from crime and
job opportunities. This setting allows a better characterization of the dynamic aspect of
hysteresis in criminal decision with respect to the opportunity cost of the legal market
for the types of crimes where the individuals are more likely to take into account the
loss of the stream of legal income. The other crucial difference is the use of prison
as the associated punishment. This section builds on the models presented in Burdett,
Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004) and Engelhardt (2010) by exploring the consequences
of criminal learning on crime choice and crime rates.
Consider now a [0, N ] continuum of infinitely lived homogeneous firms and as
in the previous sections, a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely lived risk-neutral individuals.
Homogeneity is assumed for simplicity and to show that results do not stem from ex
ante heterogeneity. An individual can be in three states: employed, unemployed or
in jail, respectively e, u, and j. Firms post an i.i.d. wage w from the distribution of
legal wages F (w). In each state, there is an associated value function for an individual
employed, unemployed or in jail given respectively by Ve(w), Vu and Vj .
Unemployed individuals consume the benefit b and receive offers from F (w) at
rate λu. Employed workers consume w and also receive offers from F (w) at rate λ and
are dismissed at rate δ.
Crime is defined here as an illicit activity that entails in a probability π > 0 of
an individual being incarcerated. Individuals encounter state-dependent opportunities
to commit a crime at a rate µu if unemployed and rate µe if employed, choosing
to undertake it with conditional probability φu and φe respectively. Individuals that
undertake the crime opportunity get a loot g and face a probability π of being caught
and going to jail.
Jailed individuals consume z and are released at an exogenous rate ρ. These two
parameters capture the severity of the punishment. A crucial assumption here is that,
if the criminal is not caught in the period the crime is perpetrated, the probability of
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punishment in the next periods will be null.35 Individuals fall victim to crime at rate
ξ. In order to close the model, ξ must be related to the endogenous crime decisions. I
assume ξ = 0, which can be interpreted as the crimes considered are victimless.
As in the previous section, criminal history at time t is given by the sum of criminal
choices in the past described in equation 2.14 and the binary variable h = 1[ht ≥ 1]
indicates if an individual has committed a crime in the last T periods. As before, the
intrinsic cost of crime is a function of criminal history described by equation 2.15
2.7.1 Crime and Legal Job Decisions
The expected gain from crime for an unemployed individual is given by:
Hu = g − m̄+ m̃h+ πVj + (1− π)Vu (2.36)
And for an employed individual is given by:
He(w) = g − m̄+ m̃h+ πVj + (1− π)Ve(w). (2.37)
An unemployed and employed individual will commit a crime given an opportunity
if Hu > Vu and He(w) > Ve(w), respectively. That implies the criminal decision for
unemployed and employed individuals to be described respectively by:
φu =
{
1 if Vu − Vj ≤ (g − m̄+ m̃h)/π





1 if Ve(w)− Vj ≤ (g − m̄+ m̃h)/π
0 if Ve(w)− Vj > (g − m̄+ m̃h)/π.
(2.39)
Defining β = 1
1+r
as the discount factor, so that r is the time preference rate, and
assuming that only one event occur at a time, the Bellman’s equation for an
unemployed individual is given by:
35This is a ubiquitous assumption in the literature. However, as discussed in section 3, it
is very unlikely that this assumption holds for serious crimes which reinforces the hysteresis
effect. As the criminal knows that even though he was not caught so far, he can go to jail at
any moment. For this reason, he may fall in the sunk cost fallacy and consider that a second
(or subsequent) criminal act will not affect the probability of being caught or the punishment
significantly.
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rVu = b+ µuφu[Hu − Vu] + λu
∫
max{Ve(x)− Vu, 0}dF (x). (2.40)
Equation 2.40 can be interpreted as the instantaneous return to being unemployed,
which equals b plus the expected value of receiving either a crime or job opportunity.
The Bellman’s equation for an employed individual is given analogously by:
rVe(w) = w + δ[Vu − Ve(w)] + µeφe(w)[He(w)− Ve(w)]
+λe
∫
max{Ve(x)− Ve(w), 0}dF (x).
(2.41)
Individuals accept a job offer if the expected present value of the returns from the
new job exceeds the value of being unemployed or the expected present value of the
returns from the current job and the net value of a crime opportunity.
Similarly, for a criminal in jail:
rVj = z + ρ[Vu − Vj]. (2.42)
Several results are unaltered in comparison with Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003,
2004). The first one is that there is a unique reservation wage w̄R, since Ve(w) in
equation 2.41 is strictly increasing in w.36 Moreover, note from equation 2.37 that
He(w) − Ve(w) is decreasing in w. That implies workers are less likely to commit a
crime when their wages are higher.
It can also be shown that Hu − Vu = He(w̄R) − Ve(w̄R). For that reason,
unemployed individuals engage in crime if and only if workers employed at w̄R do.
Therefore, as in the aforementioned articles, ∀w, φu = 0 implies φe = 0 and if φu = 1
then φe = 1 for w < w̄D and φe = 0 for w ≥ w̄D, where w̄D is the reservation wage
for committing a crime, defined by He(w̄D) = Ve(w̄D).
The following proposition establishes the reservation wage of crime as a function
of the parameters of the model. This is a similar result from Burdett, Lagos, and Wright
(2003, 2004) when the criminal history is taken into account.
36Derivation in the appendix.
76
Proposition 2.4. If the ex ante criminal choice of individuals is governed by
equations (2.38) and (2.39), and they maximise utility overtime according
Bellman’s equations (2.40) through (2.42), the reservation wage of crime is given
by
w̄D = z + (r + δ)
g − m̄+ m̃h
π
+ (ρ− δ)Γ(w̄R)− λeΨ(w̄D) (2.43)
where
Γ(w̄R) =
b− z + (g − m̄+ m̃h)µu + λuΨ(w̄R)












r + δ + λe[1− F (x)]
(2.45)
Proof. Proof in the appendix. 
Note that equation 2.43 is an implicit function of the reservation wage of crime
and several parameters of the model. Therefore, the effect of h on w̄D is obtained by
implicity differentiating equation 2.43. Proposition 2.5 establishes the relationship
between the reservation wage of crime and the criminal history. To simplify the
analysis below, I assume λe = 0 and λu = λ, i.e., there is no on-the-job search. The
results are qualitatively unaltered if this assumption is relaxed.
Proposition 2.5. If the ex ante criminal choice of individuals is governed by
equations (2.38) and (2.39), and they maximise utility overtime according
Bellman’s equations (2.40) through (2.42), ∀ π > 0, 0 ≤ w̄D < wmax, m̃ > 0, the
reservation wage of crime w̄D is a increasing function of the criminal history h.
Proof. Proof in the appendix. 
As the criminal choice ultimately depends on legal wage being below or above
the reservation wage of crime, individuals with criminal history otherwise identical
to individuals without criminal past, require a strictly higher legal wage to opt out of
crime than his/her counterparts that have never broken the law.
77
It also clear from proposition 2.5 that the impact of criminal history on the
reservation wage of crime is a function of several parameters of the model. Crucially,
it is decreasing in the probability of punishment and the reservation wage of crime, as
well as it is increasing in the time preference rate, firing rate, job offer rate and the
sensitivity of history with respect the intrinsic criminal cost.
2.7.2 Steady State Equilibria and Transition Rates
This section analyses the effect on crime rates as a consequence of the state-
dependence at the individual level discussed in the previous section. It also departs
from the model described in Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004).
In order to solve for the steady state, let U denote the number of workers
unemployed, assume φu = 0 and consider the exit rate from unemployment
ψ = 1− F (w̄R) and equate the flow of workers into employment λu[1− F (w̄R)]U to
the flow from unemployment to employment δ(1− U), and therefore
U =
δ
δ + λu[1− F (w̄R)]
, (2.46)
as in the standard model search model without crime.





κu = λu/δ, which characterise the degree of search friction from unemployment to
employment.
If φu = 1, EL can be defined as the number of workers employed at w < w̄D, EH
can be defined as the number of workers employed at w ≥ w̄D and σ = 1− F (w̄D) is
the fraction of firms offering at least w̄D. In that case, the flows in this model can be
depicted as in figure 2.11, where J denote the number of individuals in jail and dotted
arrows depict involuntary transitions.37


















Figure 2.11: Flows between states
The unemployment rate is then U∗ = U






since the number of individuals in the economy is normalised to 1 and individuals in
jail should not be considered in the rates.
It is also clear that because w̄D is increasing in h, as shown in proposition 2.5,
σ = 1 − F (w̄D) is decreasing in h. Therefore, individuals with a criminal history
will have lower transition intensities from U to EH and EL to EH , as well as higher
transition intensities from U to EH . That implies that a society with a larger fraction
of individuals with a criminal past has a higher crime rate than a society with a lower
fraction of individuals with a criminal past.
Note that in this model, hysteresis occurs even if ex-convicts are not stigmatised
in the labour market and have the same probability of employment as individuals who
have never been incarcerated. It is clear that if such assumption is relaxed, it will
reinforce the hysteresis effect.
Another implicit assumption, closely related to the previous one, is the fact that
ex-inmates have the same intrinsic/moral cost of crime (m) as the other offenders that
have not been in prison. Because individuals that have been in prison increase their
interactions with other criminals, it is likely that they have a lower m when they are
released from prison, making than more prone to re-offend. However, if the prison
system is sufficiently effective and the reduction in m would be negligible and the
punishment would make individuals less likely to commit a crime again. The impact
of that feature in the hysteresis effect would depend on the quality of the legal system.
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2.8 Conclusions
This chapter explores a theoretical model to explicitly account for hysteresis in
both criminal behaviour and crime rates in order to fill the gap between the theoretical
predictions and the empirical evidence about the efficiency of policies in reducing
crime rates.
When the probability of crime deterrence decreases or there is a fall in the real
income obtained in the labour market, some previously law-abiding agents will start
committing crimes. Because, ceteris paribus, individuals that have a criminal past are
more prone to take crime opportunities than someone that has never committed one, if
the original conditions are subsequently restored, a subset of these agents will
continue in their career in crime. At the individual level, if criminal activity is
associated with intrinsic sunk costs and learning, then the cost of leaving a criminal
career is higher than entering it. At the aggregate level with homogeneous agents, this
is translated into a hysteresis effect that will only occur if a specific threshold is
surpassed. With heterogeneous agents in terms of their intrinsic cost of crime, this
phenomenon is reinforced generating a hysteresis effect that exists for all possible
values of the variable affecting the crime decision. Only when punishment is
extremely severe will the effect of hysteresis cease to exist.
The main consequence of hysteresis is that variations in the determinants of crime
will have asymmetric effects, depending on the sign of the changes. That result
provides a more suited theoretical explanation to the reason the empirical literature
have found lower than expected effects from variations in the factor that affect crime.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the results hinge on some simplifying
assumptions.
The existence of hysteresis in crime has at least two direct implications. The first
one regards the policies to reduce crime rates. If hysteresis has a relevant effect in
criminal decision, policies to reduce crime should be focused on crime prevention
rather than mitigation. The second one is relevant to any future empirical analyses
of the impact of policies to reduce crimes. The asymmetric nature of positive and
negative shocks on crime rates must be taken into account in order to obtain a more
precise estimation of the policy effect.
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Derivation of condition 2.24





















> 0 if and only if :
m̃s̄ > $s̃ḡ, (2.50)
as all parameters above are greater or equal to zero, and ḡ, the net gain of crime
independent of punishment is also strictly positive (otherwise the criminal act to would
not be rational). As the part of sanction that does not depend on the known criminal
past (s̄) is proportional to the net gain of crime, the assumption that s̄ = ḡ implies that











m̃ > $s̃. (2.52)
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Derivation of equation 2.63
This is a variation of the derivation in Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003, 2004),
where the criminal history is taken into account. The reservation wage, as very well
established in the search literature, is obtained by solving V (w) = Vu for w.38 If
equation 2.41 is set equal to equation 2.40 and solved for w:





[Ve(x)− Ve(w̄R)]dF (x) (2.54)




V ′e (x)[1− F (x)]dx (2.55)
After differentiating the Bellman’s equation for employed workers (eq. 2.41) and










r + δ + λe[1− F (x)]
(2.56)
Subtract 2.42 and 2.40 to obtain:
Vu − Vj =
b− z + (g − m̄+ m̃h)µu + λuΨ(w̄R)
r + ρ+ µuπ
(2.57)
Plugging the last two equations into equation 2.53 yields the reservation wage.
38See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
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2.A.1 Proofs
Proof of proposition 2.2





dFm̄ = Fm̄(m̄(π))− Fm̄(m̄min) (2.58)
Using equation 2.19 and definition 2.6 in the previous equation yields:
c(π) = Fm̄(g − (1− γ)w − sπ + m̃H(π)) (2.59)
Since Fm̄ is an non-decreasing function and H(πL) > H(πH), we have that, for
any x,
Ω = Fm̄(x+ m̃H(π
L))− Fm̄(x+ m̃H(πH)) ≥ 0 (2.60)
and
Ω = Fm̄(g−(1−γ)w−s̃π+m̃H(πL))−Fm̄(g−(1−γ)w−s̃π+m̃H(πH))  (2.61)
Proof of proposition 2.4
When individuals are indifferent between committing crime, from equation 2.39,
this is equivalent to:
Ve(w̄
D) =
g − m̄+ m̃h
π
+ Vj. (2.62)
Multiply the previous equation by r and insert Bellman’s equations 2.42 2.41 at
w = w̄D to get:
w̄D = z + (r + δ)
g − m̄+ m̃h
π





r + δ + λe[1− F (x)]
.
(2.63)
From the derivation of the reservation wage in the appendix we have that:
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Vu − Vj =
b− z + (g − m̄+ m̃h)µu + λuΨ(w̄R)












r + δ + λe[1− F (x)]
(2.65)
Plugging the previous two equations into equation 2.63, in addition to the
Bellman’s equation for employed workers (eq. 2.41) and using the fact that when
individuals are indifferent between committing a crime,
g − m̄+ m̃h = π[Ve(w̄D)− Vj] yields:
w̄D = z + (r + δ)
g − m̄+ m̃h
π
+ (ρ− δ)Γ(w̄R)− λeΨ(w̄D) (2.66)
where equation 2.64 and equation 2.65 are substituted in the last equation. 
Proof of proposition 2.5
Rewrite equation 2.43 in order to define:
P (w̄D, h, ·) = −w̄D + z + (r + δ)g − m̄+ m̃h
π
+ (ρ− δ)Γ(w̄R)− λΨ(w̄D) (2.67)
where
Γ(w̄R) =
b− z + (g − m̄+ m̃h)µu + λΨ(w̄R)





















= − ∂P (w̄
D, h, ·)/∂h
∂P (w̄D, h, ·)/∂w̄D
(2.70)
Differentiate P (w̄D, h, ·) with respect to both arguments to obtain:







r + ρ+ µuπ
(2.71)







[r + ρ+ µuπ]π
, (2.72)
with the Leibniz integral rule and the fact that F (∞) = 1 being used to compute
the last partial derivative.








λ[1−F (w̄D)]+r+δ+µuπ − (r + ρ+ µuπ)π
=




λ[1−F (w̄D)]+r+δ + (r + ρ+ µuπ)π
=
(r + δ)(r + ρ+ µuπ)[1− F (w̄D) + r + δ][1− F (w̄D) + r + δ + µuπ]







> 0, ∀ π > 0, 0 ≤ w̄D < wmax, m̃ > 0. 
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Effects and Hysteresis in
Crime Rates: Evidence from the United
States
3.1 Introduction
This chapter empirically examines the predictions in the previous chapter that the
processes governing criminal behaviour are inherently permeated by hysteresis and,
consequently, the absolute value of the magnitude of the impact of variables such as
the probability of punishment and income on crime rates will depend on whether the
variations of those determinant variables are positive or negative.
It is shown that if criminal activity is associated with intrinsic sunk costs and
learning, then the cost of leaving a criminal career is higher than entering it and there
is hysteresis at the individual level, where the crime decision in a given period is
determined not only by the current expected costs and benefits entailed by the illicit
act, but it is also affected by criminal decisions taken in the past.
If there is hysteresis at the individual level, the aggregation of all crime decisions
of the agents will render hysteresis in crime rates. For any sufficiently large society, the
smallest reduction in the probability of punishment will make some individuals at the
margin between committing a crime or not to choose the illegal option. A subsequent
increase in the probability of punishment, will make some of the new criminals to stop
committing crimes, but some individuals will prefer to continue in the criminal career,
even if the probability of punishment is exactly the same as the original one.
Therefore, hysteresis in crime rates emerges from the aggregation of individual
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crime decisions that display the hysteresis effect and can be understood as a
path-dependent process, where the current level of crime depends not only on the
current levels of variables like the number of police officers and income, but also
whether their levels in the previous periods were below or above the current levels. If
there is hysteresis in crime, policies aiming to reduce crime rates will have a
diminished impact when compared to the impact where individuals with a criminal
past will behave similarly to individuals without a criminal past.
Chapter 2 concluded that there is hysteresis in crime rates for at least two of the
factors that affect them: probability of punishment and legal income, where the latter
captures the opportunity cost of crime.
One important consequence of hysteresis is that the effect on an outcome variable
from positive exogenous variations in the determining variables has a different
magnitude from negative variations. That asymmetric effect is clearer in a situation in
which the crime reduction policy in a given period is simply a reversal of a
deterioration of one determinant of crime. A concrete example would be a situation
where part of the police officers in a city are dismissed in a given year, resulting in a
escalation in crime. If all sacked police officers are readmitted in the following year
in an attempt to restore the original crime levels and hysteresis is present in the
criminal behavior, that policy will result in a lower crime rate, but higher than the
original one. 1
That prediction is empirically investigated by analysing US crime data at the state
level between 1977 and 2010, using police force size as a proxy for the probability of
punishment2 and real average income of unskilled workers as the opportunity cost of
crime.3 It is, to my knowledge, the first paper to consider the existence of asymmetric
effects of variations in the probability of punishment and in the opportunity cost of
crime.
I find that two of the main determinants of crime - police force size and real average
income of unskilled workers - have significant asymmetric effects on most types of
crimes. The average impact of positive variations in the income of unskilled workers
1Note that this a simplifying example to convey the concept of hysteresis in crime rates. It
is very unlikely that a negative variation will be followed by a positive value with the exact
same size in absolute terms. However, if crime decision is indeed permeated by hysteresis,
crime rates will also display the hysteresis property, even in the case of the absolute value of
increases/decreases are different, provided that increase are not much larger than the decreases
in absolute terms.
2From the Uniform Crime Reports - UCR Crime data compiled by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation - FBI and Annual Survey of State and Local Government Employment and Census
of Governments.
3From the Current Population Survey - CPS
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on property crime rates are statistically smaller than the absolute value of the average
effect of negative variations. That asymmetry is also observed for the law enforcement
variable in both property and violent crime.
The results are robust under several models and specifications. As will be discussed,
no theoretical or empirical analysis would be complete without careful consideration
of that important feature of the relationships between crime, police and legal income.
In the following section, I present the empirical literature of the economics of crime
focused on the impact of the probability of punishment and legal wages on crime.
The data used in the present analysis is discussed in section 3.3, while the empirical
framework is presented in section 3.4. This is followed by the results in section 3.5
and a nonparametric analysis in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Hysteresis and Asymmetric Effects in Crime
The economics of crime literature is fairly extensive as economists play a
prominent role in the pursuit to establish causality of socioeconomic variables on
aggregate crime measures. Polinsky and Shavell (2007) and Dills, Miron, and
Summers (2008) provide a relatively recent overview of contributions provided by
economists since Becker’s seminal paper. However, only very recently have the study
of persistence and asymmetric cycles been the primary focus of a study in the
empirical crime literature. The first authors (and to date, the only ones) to explicitly
test for the existence of asymmetric cycles in crimes rates were Mocan and Bali
(2010). The authors compare the effects on crime rates of positive and negative
variations on unemployment rates and obtain statistical evidence for the existence of
asymmetries in that relationship.
Hysteresis and asymmetric effects have also been the objects of empirical studies
in other areas in economics, especially in unemployment.4 Because variables like
unemployment and inflation are closely connected with GDP cycles, those studies
frequently refer to this analysis as asymmetric cycles.
3.2.2 Effect of the Probability of Punishment on Crime
The relationship between police and crime is one of the classical examples of the
pernicious effects of simultaneity on the interpretation of correlations. Even though a
4For a recent survey on hysteresis in unemployment, see O’Shaughnessy (2011).
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larger police force is expected to increase the probability of punishment and
consequently reduce crime rates, the empirically observed relationship could be
largely dominated by the positive response of the policy maker to the higher levels of
crime in the previous periods.5
Ehrlich (1973) provided the first empirical analysis in the economics of crime in
which the author was also the first to empirically estimate the relationship between the
probability of punishment (proxied by the per capita expenditure on police) and crime.
However, only almost a quarter of a century later, was the relevant issue of simultaneity
between police and crime rates the main focus of a research paper.
The first paper to use a panel data set in order to mitigate the crucial problem
of unobserved heterogeneity to estimate the impact of deterrence variables on crime
was Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), that made use of an offense ratio of face-to-face
crimes to non-face-to-face crimes and tax revenues per capita. Levitt (1997) uses
electoral cycles in the police expenditures to identify the impact of police on crimes.
However, McCrary (2002) points out some coding errors in Levitt (1997) and showed
that Levitt’s results were not statistically significant, and police would not have any
effect on crime with the instrumental variables based on electoral cycles. Levitt (2002)
provides a reply by using the number of firefighters as an instrument for police force
and finds significant effects of police on crime rates. Lin (2009) uses state tax rates
as an instrumental variable for local police numbers. Evans and Owens (2007) and
Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) instrument police levels with two types of federal law
enforcement grants.
Corman and Mocan (2000) get around the use of instrumental variables by using
monthly data and exploring the fact that the training of a police officer takes at least
six months to identify the impact of police on crime rates in New York City.
Unfortunately, that approach is not possible for a nationwide estimation in the US,
since, although monthly crime data is available at many levels of aggregation since
the first years of the Uniform Crime Reports - UCR, compiled by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation - FBI, the number of police officers are aggregated by year.
5One alternative perspective is to examine the impact on crime of exogenous variations on
the level of harshness of the penalties, rather than probability of punishment, since, as seen
in chapter 2, there is a trade-off between those variables. However, due to the fact that it
would involve the use of very restricted data and that there is little variation in the severity
of punishment across areas and over time, it is empirically challenging to examine impacts of
variations in the severity of punishment on crime. A rare empirical study on this issue is Lee
and McCrary (2009), that explores the discontinuous increase in the severity of punishment
for individuals at the age of 18. They find that a negative, but very small impact of harsher
penalties on criminal behaviour. That result corroborates the hypothesis of hysteresis in crime
from a different perspective.
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Buonanno and Mastrobuoni (2012) circumvent the endogeneity issues by exploring a
centralised and lengthy process to hire police officers in Italy.
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) and Draca, Machin, and Witt (2011) are two
prominent studies that exploit natural experiments (terrorist attacks, followed by sharp
increase in the police force in the affect city) to detect the impact of police on crime
rates.
Chalfin and McCrary (2013) show that all previous analyses suffer from severe
and unexpected measurement error in the data on the size of the police force. This
measurement error, rather than the simultaneity between police and crime, is the main
source of upwards bias in the police-crime nexus. Supported by thorough anecdotal
evidence, public administration and political economy studies, the authors make a very
compelling case for the relative exogeneity of the law enforcement variable as the
response from policy makers in the short term is extremely limited and is, to a great
extent, idiosyncratic. The authors find a consistent estimator without measurement
error by using data on the number of police from the Annual Survey of Government
(ASG) as an instrument for the standard UCR data on police. Their estimates are five
times larger in absolute value when compared to the estimates that do not correct for
the measurement error.
3.2.3 Effect of Income on Crime
Economic theory predicts that labour income has a negative effect on crime as it
encapsulates the opportunity cost of the criminal career.6 Nevertheless, many empirical
studies that analyse the impact of income on crime rates find ambiguous signs for the
associated coefficients.7 One of the reasons is related to the fact that the usual measure
of income is the overall income in a location, such as GDP per capita, which captures
the labour market expected benefits, but also the expected gain from criminal activity.
Another problem associated with the use of income measures of an area, rather
then the individual in the empirical crime equation is the possibility that the associated
coefficient is also capturing the higher propensity to report crime of richer areas, as
pointed out by Soares (2004) and Soares and Naritomi (2010).
It is a stylised fact in the crime literature that most crimes are committed by young
men. Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) explore that fact and analyse the impact
6One alternative perspective to capture the opportunity cost of crime, particularly for
developing countries, is to examine poverty rates. Loureiro (2013) provides a recent example of
that approach.
7For a survey on the studies that analyse labour market outcomes on crime, see Mustard
(2010).
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of wages of unskilled men on crime rates using a panel data set of US counties. The
authors show that the long-run trend in crime rates can be better explained by the long-
run trend in wages of unskilled men rather than by the trend in unemployment.8
It can be argued that level of income is an endogenous variable in the crime
equation if areas with high crime rates receive less investment and have less job
opportunities when compared to areas with lower crimes rates. That is less likely to
happen at the state level. However, if that was still the case, it was more likely that
this bias would be stronger in violent crimes than property crimes. However, the fact
that none of the coefficients associated to violent crime are statistically significant
provides little support for the hypothesis of simultaneity between income levels and
crime in the present analysis.
Another possibility in this direction is that individuals with better job prospects
in terms of wages, emigrate from areas with high levels of crime. Cullen and Levitt
(1999) show that every additional reported crime is associated with one-person person
decline in a average city with at least 100,000 inhabitants in the US. However, most
migration occurred within the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). As the great
majority of the MSAs in the US are within one state, it is less likely that such effect
occur at the state level.
Doyle, Ahmed, and Horn (1999) and Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) show
that OLS and GMM estimates do not vary significantly, suggesting that endogeneity of
income is not a concern in the crime equation.
3.3 Data
I analyse data from the 50 US states between 1977 and 2010. Six crime categories
are used. Three types of property crime: burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft;
and three types of violent crime: murder, aggravated assault and forcible rape. All
crime variables are calculated in terms of rates per 100,000 inhabitants. These data are
obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports - UCR Crime data compiled by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation - FBI, and obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research - ICPSR, which also provides data on police officers per
100,000 inhabitants.
A usual concern with respect to crime data is the existence of measurement error
in crime rates, especially underreporting. This problem can be greatly mitigated by
8Freeman (1996) provides an inquiry about the reasons that make young unskilled men more
prone to commit crimes.
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the use of panel data techniques that control for unobserved heterogeneity. Any
measurement error in the dependent variable not captured by this approach will only
affect the standard errors of the coefficients, reducing the probability of rejecting the
null of no relationship.
A more pernicious problem is related to measurement error of one of the
explanatory variables.9 The studies in the empirical literature of the economics of
crime displayed no concern about the existence of measurement error in the
explanatory variables in the crime equation. Chalfin and McCrary (2013) show the
great deal of measurement error in the police force rates obtained from the UCR data.
There are two sources of measurement error in the law enforcement variable generally
used in the literature: 1. Misclassification in what constitutes a sworn police officer; 2.
Underestimation of the population size used in the calculation in the police officers
rate, especially in the years prior to the census.
I tackle one of the sources of measurement error by correcting the population used
in both UCR and ASG data sets by nonparametric smoothing. This issue is especially
crucial in the present study, as it explore the positive and negative variations in the
police officers rate.
Because the theoretical sign of the coefficient associated to police is negative, the
measurement error in the police variable will cause the estimated coefficient to be
overestimated, increasing the probability of the type II error.
I also used the number of police officers from the Annual Survey of State and
Local Government Employment and Census of Governments - hereafter ASG data -
run by the US Census Bureau. The data for federal and state employees are the actual
numbers, however, as the local government statistics are based on a sample of local
governments, and the same reasons that can lead to measurement error in the UCR
data are also present, the variable from this source is also noisy.
Because the police data from the UCR and ASG data in each year are a snapshot
of October,10 I follow the usual procedure in the literature to use the measures for the
previous year in all regressions. In addition, because the years included in the analysis
are restricted only by the CPS data (before 1977, some states are not in the sample), I
can keep the 34 years by using police data in 1976.
I generate the average real income of young males without college and the other
control variables by using microdata from the Current Population Survey - CPS,
9 If it is the classical measurement error problem, the estimate of the coefficient will suffer
from attenuation bias. See Fuller (1987), Hausman (2001) and Wooldridge (2002).
10After 1997 the month was March in the ASG data. I include a dummy variable to account
for that fact in the regressions involving the two measures.
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provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and which I retrieved from Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series - IPUMS.11 Details on the extraction and organisation of
the data is outlined in the appendix 3.A.1.
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Trends in Crime Rates, Police Force
and Wages
Figure 3.1 shows the trends for the proportion of police officers by 100,000
inhabitants, real total income for unskilled workers and for the overall population in
the United States between 1977 and 2010. There is a sustained increase in the three
variables over the period, with exceptions given by a pronounced decrease in law
enforcement in the beginning of the 80s and a significant decline in the total real
income after the economic crisis in 2008. A closer look at the police variable reveals
the short term cyclicality of this variable, first pointed out by Levitt (1997).12
Figure 3.1: Police Rate and Overall Average Income and Unskilled Workers Income -
USA - 1977-2010
Data Source: UCR/FBI and CPS.
11King, Ruggles, Alexander, Flood, Genadek, Schroeder, Trampe, and Vick (2012)
12Figure 3.1 suggests that the variables are non-stationary. Panel data tests that account
for heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient of the Dickey-Fuller regression, cross-section
dependence and level shifts reject the hypothesis of unit roots for police, income and crime rates.
Additionally, most series for the individual states are trend-stationary (stationary after the trend
is accounted for) and this result is even stronger when at least one structural break is allowed.
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Figures 3.2a and 3.2b display crime rates and clearance rates13 for respectively
property and violent crimes in the US between 1970 and 2010. There is an unequivocal
turn in the trend of both types of crimes that does not coadunate with clearance rates
over the period.
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables under analysis for the
50 US states between 1977 and 2010.14 The first part of the table presents the statistics
related to crime rates. It is clear that larcenies correspond to the bulk of property
crimes in the US, whereas aggravated assaults represents the great majority of crimes
registered as violent.
It is also possible to observe that the two alternative measures of police force, data
from the UCR/FBI and the ASG have similar means and standard deviations. That
is also captured by the scatter plot between the two measures in figure 3.15 in the
appendix. It is clear that police and population data from both the UCR and the ASG
have very similar distributions, but there is still significant noise in the measurement
of those variables in both sources.
Another important aspect regarding the UCR police variable, the reference
measure of law enforcement in this paper, regards the fraction of observations across
the states and over the years that had positive variations. Table 3.1 shows that
approximately 61% of the states/years had positive variations in police in the period
under consideration. That is confirmed by figure 3.3a which shows the distribution of
variations in police force for the uncorrected data. Figure 3.3b displays the same
information for the corrected data, which has a very similar pattern. As expected, the
variations are concentrated around the smallest values. The variations in the police
force can also be observed in figure 3.5 which displays the law enforcement sizes for
all states between 1977 and 2010.
Also from table 3.1, it is possible to observe that the level of income of unskilled
workers was larger, when compared to the previous year in 89% of the cases. This fact
can also be observed from figure 3.6. Even tough the number of negative variations is
relatively small, figures 3.4a and 3.4b shows that the variations for both the income of
unskilled workers and all workers were larger in absolute terms than the ones observed
for police.
The spatial distribution across the continental states of the variables discussed in
this section are displayed in appendix 3.A.2.
13Clearance rates refer to the proportion of crimes that are solved by the arrest of the
perpetrator.
14Washington DC is excluded from the sample for constituting a classical outlier in the
analysis, since its law enforcement size is considerably larger than all other states.
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(a) Property Crime (b) Violent Crime
Figure 3.2: Crime rates and Clearance Rates - USA - 1970-2010
Data Source: UCR/FBI.
(a) ∆Police (b) ∆Police Corrected
Figure 3.3: Histograms and Kernel Densities (Epanechnikov): Police
(a) ∆Income - No College (b) ∆ Income
Figure 3.4: Histograms and Kernel Densities (Epanechnikov): Income
Data Source: CPS.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics - States
N mean sd min max
Property Crime Rate 1700 4089.4 1177.44 1705.3 7996
Burglary Rate 1700 985.22 414.26 292.3 2906.7
Larceny Rate 1700 2723.07 725.48 1235.6 5106.1
Motor Vehicle Theft Rate 1700 381.11 204.62 70.5 1157.7
Violent Crime Rate 1700 450.61 228.27 47 1244.3
Murder Rate 1700 6.13 3.53 0.2 20.3
Aggravated Assault Rate 1700 278.79 146.62 31.3 785.7
Forcible Rape Rate 1700 34.45 13.54 7.3 102.2
Police Officers rate - UCR 1700 205.68 54.9 68.84 434.24
Police Officers per - ASG 1700 203.85 42.6 122.40 403.08
Variation in UCR Police > 0 1700 0.61 0.49 0 1
Total Real Income 1700 19041.11 12954.5 1686.25 56685.22
Total Real Income - No College 1700 15823.39 9540.4 1686.25 41398.51
Variation in Income - No College > 0 1700 0.89 0.31 0 1
Unemployment Rate 1700 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.19
Unemployment Rate - No College 1700 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.19
Perc. Urban Area 1700 0.61 0.26 0 1
Fraction of Female Headed HH 1700 0.27 0.03 0.11 0.36
Perc. of Young Males 1700 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.15
Total Real Income of HH 1700 43366.54 29683.26 3994.7 142940.75
Population - CPS 1700 5.08E+06 5.55E+06 365149 3.57E+07
Population - UCR 1700 5.29E+06 5.82E+06 410986 3.73E+07
Population - ASG 1700 5.22E+06 5.70E+06 402000 3.73E+07
Notes: All monetary variables adjusted by CPI in 2010. Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
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Figure 3.5: Police Rate by State
Data Source: UCR/FBI.




I focus attention on two variables susceptible to public policy and that potentially
affect crime rates: income levels and number of police officers, with the last variable
being potentially endogenous. However, as discussed in section 3.2, the
uncoordinated efforts of overlapping police agencies make this variable relatively
exogenous, especially at the state level. As in Chalfin and McCrary (2013), I focus
attention at another source of endogeneity: measurement error of the police
variable.15 The other variables present in the theoretic model of crime and relevant to
the decision of the individual at the margin are either controlled by observable
variables or assumed to vary across states (but constant over time) and captured by the
fixed effects, such as the severity of the punishment. Other variables that are not
explicitly considered in the theoretical economic model, but can also affect crime, like
the urbanization rate and fraction of young males are also included in the regressions.
I start by investigating the existence of asymmetric effects in variations of wages.
As it will be seen in the next subsection, a similar approach is not feasible for the
police variable as it would require the availability of two different instruments for
each direction of variation. To examine the hypothesis of asymmetric cycles in the
number of police officers, I will split the sample in two sub-samples, according to the
predominance of positive or negative variations in the police force.
3.4.1 Random Coefficients Model











1 if ∆Incomeit ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(3.2)
15The third possible source of endogeneity is omitted variable problem. That is a less likely
possibility in the present analysis after controlling for several relevant variables and state and
fixed effects.
16This is similar to the procedure adopted by Mocan and Bali (2010), that analyses the
asymmetric effects of unemployment. However, the authors do not relax the assumption of a
common intercept and as it will be seen, that is crucial to the analysis of asymmetric effects of









Incomeit if ∆Incomeit < 0
0 otherwise
(3.4)
Crimeit denotes one of the crime rates described in the previous section, Policeit−1
is the proportion of police officers relative to the state population in the previous period,
Incomeit is the average real17 income level for unskilled workers, x′it is a vector of
socioeconomic variables and ψi and λt are respectively state and year fixed effects. 18
If individuals get locked in crime and there is hysteresis in the relationship between
crime and income, a test of the hypothesis that |δ1| = |δ2| must be rejected. However,
note that the converse is not necessarily true. It must be emphasized that the detection
of asymmetric effects is only indicative of the existence hysteresis in crime rates.
Additionally, note that the inclusion of the term δ0 as defined by equation 3.2
relaxes the assumption of common intercepts for positive and negative changes. If this
coefficient is not included, a linear specification might not reject the null hypothesis
of homogeneous slopes for positive and negative variations, even if this is the case in
the data.19 As it will be seen in the following section, the assumption of heterogenous
intercepts for positive and negative changes in the wage rate is crucial to correctly
specify equation 3.1.
One would be worried about multicolinearity problem arising from the fact of
estimating Income+ and Income− in the same equation. That would be the case
in a cross-sectional analysis, but the use of panel data dilute this problem.
3.4.2 Sample Split
An important implicit assumption under the specification given by equations
3.1-3.4 is that all other coefficients and state and time fixed effects are common to
both states with predominantly positive variations and states with predominantly
17Deflated using the CPI with base in 2000.
18Baltagi, Matyas, and Sevestre (2008) show that an over-specification of the error components
model (estimate a two-way model when the true model is one-way) provides consistent estimates,
whereas under-specification of the error components model (estimate a one-way model when the
true model is two-way) generates inconsistent estimates.
19To some extent, this is equivalent to the situation of a simple linear regression where the
intercept is not specified when the data display an association that does not depart from the
origin. In the case of where the true relationship is positive and has a positive intercept, the
omission of the intercept in the regression will lead to an overestimation of the coefficient and
potentially to an incorrect non-rejection of the null of no relationship.
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negative variations. To check the robustness of the results, I split the sample
according to the predominance of positive variations (number of positive variations
above the average). 20 Because the threshold here is known, the inference is based on
the standard distributions.21 The empirical model is then given by the following
equations:
Crimeit = ψ1i + λ1t + x
′
itβ1 + γ1Policeit−1 + δ1Incomeit + ε1it, if i ∈ Γ (3.5)
Crimeit = ψ2i + λ2t + x
′
itβ2 + γ2Policeit−1 + δ2Incomeit + ε2it, if i /∈ Γ (3.6)
where Γ is the set of states with positive variations in income above the average.
That model allows to use the instrumental variable approach22 to estimate the
heterogeneity of negative and positive variations in police force using the same
instrument:
Crimeit = φ1i + λ1t + x
′
itβ1 + θ1Policeit−1 + %1Incomeit + µ1it, if i ∈ Ω (3.7)
Crimeit = φ2i + λ2t + x
′
itβ2 + θ2Policeit−1 + %2Incomeit + µ2it, if i /∈ Ω (3.8)
where Ω is the set of states with positive variations in police above the average.
To simplify the analysis, I exclude the police variable from equations 3.5 and 3.6
in the estimations presented in section 3.5.
3.4.3 Measurement Error in Police and IV Estimation
As recently emphasised by Chalfin and McCrary (2013), there is considerable
measurement error in the law enforcement variable caused by misclassification and
underestimation of the population size, especially in years prior to the census. That
20Chan (1993) shows that this type of estimator is strongly consistent.
21To see the properties of sample splitting and threshold estimators, see Hansen (1999) and
Hansen (2000).
22Caner and Hansen (2004) show that if the threshold is exogenous, the IV/GMM estimator
is consistent, but not necessarily efficient.
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measurement error would lead to the attenuation bias, which in the present case would
be an upward bias.
The authors claim that measurement error, rather than the simultaneity between
police and crime would the main source of upwards bias in the relationship between
police and crime. They claim that the police variable would be relatively exogenous,
since the response from policy makers in the short term is extremely limited. That
argument is even more compelling for state level data as the police department efforts
are combinations of overlapping and uncoordinated local police agencies.
In order to tackle the measurement error in the police officers rates, I will follow
Chalfin and McCrary (2013) and instrument the UCR/FBI law enforcement measure
with the ASG measure. This procedure in which a noisy measure of police is used as an
instrument for another measure of police will provide consistent estimates, conditional
on the fact that the assumptions in the classical measurement error model hold.
Classical Measurement Error Model
Consider a crime equation with all variables and time and fixed effects netted out,
apart from the correctly measured police size Police∗it:
Crimeit = η0 + η1Police
∗
it + εit (3.9)
and E(Police∗itεit) = 0. However, if Police
∗
it is not observed, and all that can be
observed is a noisy measure of police, Policeit, and the corresponding measurement
error is given by:
eit = Policeit − Police∗it (3.10)
It is assumed that E(eit) = 0 and since E(Police∗itεit) = 0 as well as
E(Policeitεit) = 0, we have that E(eitεit) = 0 .
A crucial assumption is that:
E(eitPolice
∗
it) = 0 (3.11)
Equation 3.11 is the classical errors-in-variables (CEV)23
The OLS estimation of the crime equation with the noisy police variable will yield:
Crimeit = γ0 + γ1(Policeit − eit) + εit
= γ0 + γ1Policeit + κit
(3.12)
23For details, see Wooldridge (2002).
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with κit = εit − γ1eit and consequently E(Policeit · κit) 6= 0














for σ2Police∗ 6= σ2Police.
IV Solution
With the use of another independent and noisy measure of police Policebit and
respective measurement error given by:
uit = Police
b
it − Police∗it (3.14)

















= E(Police∗itPoliceit) + 0 > 0
(3.16)
which are respectively the conditions of exclusion and relevance for the instrument.
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3.5 Results
This section presents the estimates of the models specified in the previous section.
All regressions control for state and year effects and for the variables discussed in the
data section.24 The standard errors are clustered at the state level and all coefficients
are standardised. All regressions with instruments reject the null of weak instruments
and underidentification.25
Table 3.2 provides the estimates for the baseline model with respect to the level of
income of unskilled workers.26 Tables with the same approach where the overall level
of income is used are presented in the appendix.
A higher level of income for unskilled workers has a negative impact on property
crime, burglary and larceny, with an increase in one standard deviation in income
contributing to reduce those crimes by respectively 0.84, 0.76 and 0.87 deviations.
Those are very large magnitudes if one considers the size of the standard deviations of
those variables. There is no statistically significant effect on motor vehicle theft or any
violent crime.
The fact that impact of income is only observed on property crimes is in line
with the empirical literature that find some evidence in this direction. This is also
an expected result from the theoretical perspective, as the effect of the level of wages
would play a role as an opportunity cost of crime in the less serious crimes.
24The year effects capture the trends and common shocks such as changes in federal legislation
and efficiency of the police to deter crime. The models were estimated with First Differences as
well, yielding similar coefficients to the Fixed effects estimates.
25The tests are respectively the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap rank
LM statistic.
26In order to simplify the analysis, I exclude the police variable from the estimations focused
on the impact of income on crime.
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Table 3.2: Crime Equations - States - Unskilled Workers Total Income - Baseline
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Unskilled Workers
Total Income -0.85*** -0.77*** -0.90*** -0.18 -0.00 0.30** 0.07 0.05
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.28)
Constant -1.21*** -0.54 -1.57*** -0.34 -0.33 0.47** -0.36 -0.33
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.20) (0.16) (0.27) (0.40)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.63 0.71 0.58 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.26
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved
state, time and two-way effects, respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the Proportion of black people,
Proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years old
Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/CPS.
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3.5.1 Random Coefficients Model
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the estimates of the empirical models presented at
section 3.4.1 with respect to the level of income of unskilled workers. Tables with the
same approach where the overall level of income is used are presented in the appendix.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the estimation of equation 3.1 with δ0 = 0.27 There
is no evidence of asymmetries between positive and negative variation with a common
intercept.28 However, as discussed in chapter 2, if there is a hysteresis loop in the
relationship, it would be nonlinear. For a sample of observed values within a relatively
short range of income values, the assumption of linearity is fairly reasonable, but the
assumption of common intercept is very restrictive.29
That assumption is relaxed in the estimation presented in Table 3.4. There are
asymmetric effects on positive and negative variations in wages for all property crime
rates, apart from motor vehicle theft. Reductions of one standard deviation in the
level of income of unskilled workers increase those crime rates by approximately one
standard deviation. Increases in those variables produce a decrease in crime rates,
however, that reduction is significantly smaller in absolute value than the ones observed
when wages increase.
As in the previous approach, the impact of income is only observed on property
crimes. It is also important to note that the estimated coefficients are now all larger
then the ones observed when the assumption of common slopes and intercepts for
positive and negative variations on income is implicitly assumed.
27I also exclude the police variable from the estimations focused on the impact of income on
crime, in order to simplify the analysis and the exposition of the results.
28When testing the hypothesis of asymmetric effects, I use the more conservative two-sided
test rather then the one-sided test, since the latter is more powerful to reject the null than the
former.
29That assumption was present in Mocan and Bali (2010) in their analysis using unemployment.
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Table 3.3: Crime Equations - States - Unskilled Workers Total Income - Asymmetric Effects - Common Intercept
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Unskilled Workers
Total Income (Negative ∆) -0.50 -0.31 -0.69* 0.11 0.14 0.80*** 0.12 0.21
(0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.42) (0.27) (0.23) (0.29) (0.35)
Unskilled Workers
Total Income (Positive ∆) -0.50 -0.33 -0.66* 0.10 0.12 0.75*** 0.11 0.21
(0.32) (0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.25) (0.21) (0.27) (0.33)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.67 0.76 0.60 0.48 0.55 0.66 0.56 0.35
Positive ∆=Negative ∆ test 1.01 0.79 0.84 2.67 2.87 1.53 4.03 0.37
p-value 0.31 0.77 0.36 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.05 0.54
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/CPS.
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Table 3.4: Crime Equations - States - Unskilled Workers Total Income - Asymmetric Effects
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Unskilled Workers
Total Income (Negative ∆) -1.03*** -0.94*** -1.05*** -0.38 0.01 0.33* 0.14 -0.07
(0.26) (0.24) (0.28) (0.30) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21) (0.32)
Unskilled Workers
Total Income (Positive ∆) -0.88*** -0.79** -0.92*** -0.29 0.00 0.34** 0.08 0.03
(0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.29) (0.15) (0.11) (0.20) (0.29)
Positive ∆ Unskilled Workers
Total Income =1 -0.27* -0.32** -0.21* -0.18 0.02 -0.08 0.15 -0.22
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.20)
Constant -1.01** -0.25 -1.43*** -0.28 -0.33 0.59** -0.46 -0.18
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.42) (0.24) (0.18) (0.31) (0.47)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.62 0.71 0.57 0.26 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.25
Positive ∆=Negative ∆ test 8.88 10.96 7.95 1.84 0.26 0.34 2.78 1.10
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.61 0.55 0.10 0.29
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/CPS.
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3.5.2 Sample Split
In this section I estimate the empirical models proposed in section 3.4.2,
correcting for measurement error in the police force variable. Table 3.5 present the
estimates for asymmetric variations in wages.30 The results are qualitative similar to
the previous approach, indicating strong asymmetric effects for all property crime
rates, apart from motor vehicle theft. Nevertheless, the asymmetries are sharper than
the ones observed in the random coefficients approach, under the assumption of
homogeneous effects.
I now turn the focus to test the existence of asymmetric effects of police on crime.
As a benchmark, the first part of table 3.6 presents the estimates without the correction
for the measurement error in the population and police force sizes, whereas the second
part display the results when both issues are tackled according to the strategy specified
in section 3.4.3.
Table 3.7 present the estimates for asymmetric variations in police size. The
asymmetric effects are even sharper than the ones observed for wages. There are
asymmetric effects on positive and negative variations in the number of police officers
for all crime rates, except larceny and rape. Reductions of one standard deviation in
the police force size increase those crime rates produce increases in crime rates with
varying magnitudes in terms of standard deviations. The largest effect is observed for
motor vehicle theft, where reducing the police presence can increase crime rates by
2.59 standard deviations. More strikingly, increases in the number of police officers
produce a decrease only in murder rates, with reduction being significantly smaller in
absolute value than the ones observed in a police increase. All the other crime rates
are either not statistically sensible to positive variations in police or positively
affected by increase in police in the short run. That suggests that there still
simultaneity between police and crime. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe
that this asymmetric effects would not persist if that issue is taken into account.
Table 3.8 present a robustness check. The results are robust to alternative
estimation strategies, especially in terms of the sign of the coefficients. The
conclusions of the test for the differences of the coefficients in this table are very
similar to the ones in the previous analysis and therefore omitted. The results are
robust across the alternative estimation procedures.
The first part of the table shows the estimates when the District of Columbia (DC)
is included in the sample (initially excluded for having a level of police much higher
30As in previous section, I exclude the police variable from the estimations focused on the
impact of income on crime.
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than all US states). Asymmetric effects are also found with this approach. However,
unlike the estimates where DC is not included, the effects from police are intensified
and the asymmetries are more evident. Additionally, unlike the previous approach,
Larceny has a negative impact from negative variations in police.
It can also be seen from table 3.8 that the results are not greatly altered when other
approaches are used: excluding all the other covariates; excluding very small variations
in police; excluding all states with population size below the 25th percentile and when
the regressions are not weighted by the population size of each state.
However, as suggested in chapter 2, the relationship between crime rates and its
main determinants is more likely to be non-linear rather than linear as assumed in the
preceding analysis.
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Table 3.5: Crime Equations - States - Unskilled Workers Total Income - Split Sample
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Unskilled Workers
Total Income (Negative ∆) -1.23*** -1.14*** -1.25*** -0.39*** -0.12 0.16** 0.05 -0.44**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.17)
Constant -1.93*** -1.26*** -2.19*** -0.86*** -0.49*** 0.14 -0.27 -0.88**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15) (0.27)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816
R2 0.636 0.702 0.582 0.211 0.307 0.488 0.262 0.280
Unskilled Workers
Total Income (Positive ∆) -0.44*** -0.33** -0.48*** -0.19 0.10 0.53*** 0.05 0.65***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13)
Constant -0.48* 0.28 -0.90*** -0.13 -0.18 0.88*** -0.49** 0.38
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.26) (0.15) (0.10) (0.17) (0.22)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 884 884 884
R2 0.621 0.742 0.546 0.310 0.361 0.493 0.385 0.237
Positive ∆=Negative ∆ test 4.63 14.29 4.48 40.92 9.98 2.29 0.19 0.78
p-value 0.0316 0.0002 0.0244 0.0000 0.0016 0.1303 0.6628 0.3760
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
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Table 3.6: Crime Equations - States - Police & Total Income - OLS & IV
OLS Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Police 0.47* 0.37 0.63** -0.21 0.00 -0.16* 0.11 0.01
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.21) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.20)
Total Income -1.01*** -0.85*** -0.93*** -0.79* -0.48*** 0.23*** -0.41** -0.53**
(0.22) (0.18) (0.21) (0.40) (0.18) (0.07) (0.20) (0.26)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.791 0.856 0.742 0.510 0.606 0.726 0.580 0.621
IV & Population Correction Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Police 0.51** 0.15 1.10*** -1.12*** -0.43** -0.67*** -0.21 0.57***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.27) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Total Income -0.86*** -0.75*** -0.72*** -0.88*** -0.54*** 0.12*** -0.46*** -0.37***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.796 0.851 0.735 0.462 0.601 0.654 0.566 0.583
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
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Table 3.7: Crime Equations - States - Police - Split Sample - IV & Population Correction
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Police (Negative ∆) -0.35 -0.55* -0.54** -2.59*** -1.74*** -0.71*** -1.37*** 0.62**
(0.28) (0.30) (0.25) (0.47) (0.31) (0.16) (0.25) (0.23)
Total Income -0.42*** -0.45*** -0.34** -0.30 -0.01 0.19*** -0.07 0.03
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 714 714 714 714 714 714 714 714
R2 0.865 0.902 0.829 0.514 0.616 0.725 0.623 0.659
Police (Positive ∆) 1.44*** 0.86*** 1.67*** 0.64* 0.20 -0.54*** 0.02 0.58**
(0.29) (0.23) (0.30) (0.28) (0.14) (0.11) (0.19) (0.21)
Total Income -0.88*** -0.85*** -0.76*** -0.67*** -0.40*** -0.04 -0.19* -0.81***
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 986 986 986 986 986 986 809866 986
R2 0.646 0.788 0.544 0.552 0.615 0.772 0.500 0.459
Positive ∆=Negative ∆ test 3.13 6.42 0.22 9.38 3.73 9.61 12.09 2.24
p-value 0.0767 0.0113 0.6376 0.0022 0.0534 0.0019 0.0005 0.1341
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
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Table 3.8: Crime Equations - States - Police - Split Sample - Robustness Check
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Include DC
Police (Negative ∆) -1.29*** -1.89*** 0.25 -4.18*** -2.24*** -2.06*** -1.06*** 0.51*
Police (Positive ∆) 1.19*** 0.65** 1.37*** 0.67** 0.50* 0.53 0.61* -0.07
No covariates
Police (Negative ∆) -0.94** -1.26*** 0.44 -4.13*** -2.05*** -2.04*** -0.99*** 0.40
Police (Positive ∆) 1.31*** 0.77*** 1.48*** 0.78*** 0.24* -0.31*** 0.17 0.22
Exclude |∆police| < 1
Police (Negative ∆) -1.00** -1.63*** 0.40 -3.61*** -1.94*** -1.81*** -0.87*** 0.52
Police (Positive ∆) 0.99** 0.45* 1.24** 0.40* 0.14 -0.33** 0.17 -0.05
Exclude pop. < 25 perc.
Police (Negative ∆) -1.29*** -1.91*** 0.22 -4.13*** -2.16*** -2.09*** -0.95*** 0.59*
Police (Positive ∆) 0.98*** 0.55** 1.22** 0.35 0.13 -0.29** 0.08 0.11
No population weights
Police (Negative ∆) -0.43 -1.04*** 1.12** -3.99*** -1.73*** -0.80*** -1.27*** 1.22*
Police (Positive ∆) 1.08*** 0.51*** 1.30*** 0.58*** 0.06 -0.36*** 0.09 -0.21
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
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3.6 Semiparametric Estimation
All the analyses in the previous sections, and indeed all longitudinal studies in the
crime literature, assumed linearity of the investigated relationships and all coefficient
comparisons were in terms of the means. In order to test if those assumptions were
very restrictive I estimate the asymmetric effects of positive and negative variations in
wages and police on crime nonparametrically.
That also allows to reconcile the observed asymmetric effects with the concept of
hysteresis, by taking into account the shape of the relationships over the observed sup-
port of both wages and police and the theoretical possible values of those variables. If
there is hysteresis the confidence intervals for the negative and positive variations rela-
tionships should not overlap in at least a significant part of the independent variable.
In the nonparametric approach, I keep the same structure of the previous sections
controlling linearly for the state/time effects, covariates and instrument. For that reason
the procedure in this section is effectively a semiparametric estimation.
The models discussed in section 3.4.2 can be now restated as semiparametric single
index models:
Crimeit = ϕ1(ψ1i + λ1t + x
′
itβ1 + γ1Policeit−1 + δ1Incomeit) + ε1it if i ∈ Γ (3.17)
Crimeit = ϕ2(ψ2i + λ2t + x
′
itβ2 + γ2Policeit−1 + δ2Incomeit) + ε2it if i /∈ Γ (3.18)
Crimeit = ϕ3(φ1i +λ1t + x
′
itβ1 + θ1Policeit−1 + %1Incomeit) +µ1it if i ∈ Ω (3.19)
Crimeit = ϕ4(φ2i +λ2t + x
′
itβ2 + θ2Policeit−1 + %2Incomeit) +µ2it if i /∈ Ω (3.20)
where Γ is the set of states with positive variations in income above the average, Ω
is the set of states with positive variations in police above the average and ϕk, k =
{1, 2, 3, 4} are estimated nonparametrically.31
31For the properties of the semiparametric single index model, see Ichimura (1993), that
established the estimator.
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As in the parametric estimation, I simplify the analysis by excluding the police
variable from the estimations of equations 3.17 and 3.18.





(1− |z|3)3 × 1(|z| < 1). (3.21)
One of its advantages lies on the fact that, unlike most nonparametric estimators
based on other kernel functions, it is a robust estimator against outliers.32 Because the
results of nonparametrically estimated models are much more sensible to the
bandwidth choice, rather than the kernel choice, even for the Lowess estimator, I test
the robustness of the estimates for different values of bandwidth.
In order to implement the semiparametric single index models for panel data, I
partial out the control variables and the fixed and time effects where the residuals,
rather than the variables in levels are used in order to account for state and year effects,
in addition to all control variables and the instrument used in the previous section.
Equations 3.17-3.20 are then rewritten as:
Resid(Crimeit) = ϕ1(δ1Resid(Incomeit)) + ε1it if i ∈ Γ (3.22)
Resid(Crimeit) = ϕ2(δ2Resid(Incomeit)) + ε2it if i /∈ Γ (3.23)
Resid(Crimeit) = ϕ3(θ1Resid(Policeit−1)) + ζ1it if i ∈ Ω (3.24)
Resid(Crimeit) = ϕ4(θ2Resid(Policeit−1)) + ζ2it if i /∈ Ω (3.25)
The Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem ensures that the estimated coefficients δ1, δ2, θ1
and θ1 in equations 3.17-3.20 are identical to the ones in equations 3.22-3.25.33
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the nonparametric estimates using the Lowess estimator
with 0.5 bandwidth. The results are qualitatively unaltered for a different variations of
levels of bandwidth and presented in the appendix.
Figure 3.7 provides a clear evidence of asymmetric effects for property crime
rates. The degree of asymmetry is particularly strong for higher values of wages and
nonexistent for lower levels of the distribution. This result is consistent with the
32For details, see Fan and Gijbels (1996) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
33See Frisch and Waugh (1933) and Lovell (2008).
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hypothesis of hysteresis that predicts a larger gap between directions of variations as
we move away from lower values of the independent variable.
Figure 3.7: Positive vs Negative Variation in Wages - Lowess estimator - Band-
width=0.5
Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
Figure 3.8 displays the lowess estimates for the residuals of the IV regressions for
the different crime rates and the police size. The results are similar to the ones observed
for wages, but with the evidence of asymmetric effects present for all types of crimes.
One important conclusion that can be taken form figure 3.8 is that all crime rates are
negatively associated to police when this variable is fairly monotonically decreasing,
but the relationship is highly nonlinear for positive variations.
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Figure 3.8: Positive vs Negative Variation in Police - Lowess estimator - Bandwidth=0.5
Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG/CPS.
It is also important to note from 3.8 that the positive coefficients associated to
positive variations in police officers obtained in the linear specification of the previous
section were crucially stemming from increases when the size of the police force were
smaller than the average in the sample. For higher numbers of police officers, those
relationships are all negative, except to murder, but the slopes are still significantly
larger in absolute value when compared to negative variations in police, respectively
to each type of crime.
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3.7 Conclusions
This chapter estimates the asymmetric impact of police and income on property
and violent crime rates in the US between 1997 and 2010. This is the first effort to
capture these asymmetries and it is also the first to correct for the measurement error
at a higher level of aggregation. Furthermore, this is also the first analysis to take
into account the existence of nonlinearities in the main determinants of crime with
longitudinal aggregate crime data.
There is evidence of asymmetric effects of positive and negative variations in the
level of income for both unskilled workers and the general population for property
crime rates. In general, reductions of one standard deviation in the level of real
income of unskilled workers increase those crime rates by approximately one
standard deviation. Increases in the levels of real income produce a decrease in crime
rates, however, that reduction is significantly smaller in absolute value than the ones
observed when real income increase.
Those asymmetric effects are also observed for positive and negative variations in
the number of police officers for all crime rates, except larceny and rape. Reductions
of one standard deviation in the size of the police force increase those crime rates
by one to four standard deviations, depending on the type of crime. For some types
crimes and under some specifications, increases in the police size produce a decrease
is significantly smaller in absolute value than the ones observed when law enforcement
increase. For most specifications and types of crime, police and crime are positively
associated when only positive variations are considered. A closer inspection with a
semiparametric estimation reveals that the slopes are positive only for lower levels of
police officers and they are negative for higher levels, except to murder, but the slopes
are still significantly larger in absolute value when compared to negative variations in
police, respectively to each type of crime.
The magnitude of the asymmetries found in this chapter supports the hypothesis
of hysteresis in crime and suggests that no theoretical or empirical analysis would be
complete without careful consideration of that important feature of the relationships
between crime, police and legal income. These results are relevant for any empirical
analysis of policies at crime reduction, but they are particularly important for
evaluations of policies based on increases of police force size.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Extraction and Organisation of the Data
In this section I explain the details of extraction of the data from three used
sources: Uniform Crime Reports - UCR, Current Population Survey - CPS and Annual
Survey of State and Local Government Employment and Census of Governments -
ASG.
UCR Data
The crime and police data are provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation -
FBI that runs the Uniform Crime Reports - UCR. Because the FBI webpage provide
only the most recent years of data, I used the historical series archived by the
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research - ICPSR that dates back
to 1966. However, years prior 1975 follow a very different methodology of
organisation. And because the CPS data was not representative to all states before
1977, I restrict the sample between 1977 and 2010. This compilation of local
government data provides a snapshot in October for the number of police personnel,
disaggregated by police officers and administrative workers. To calculate the crime
variables, I use the number of offenses that are available at monthly basis and are
disaggregated by several categories of crime, where each category and each month is
recorded in an individual variable. I group the data onto the crime types used in this
paper by year. I use all main categories of crime: burglary, larceny, motor vehicle
theft, murder, aggravated assault and forcible rape. I calculate the crime rates by
dividing each crime variable by the respective population in each state and multiply
by 100,000. A similar procedure is carried out to obtain the number of police officers
by 100,000 inhabitants.
CPS Data
I use the data from the Current Population Survey - CPS, provided by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics to construct most of the covariates in the estimated model, including
the personal level of income. The microdata for the interviews carried out in march is
available at the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) website since 1962.
However, the data is representative to all states only after 1977. The micro data is




In order to obtain the second measurement of police size, I also used the number
of police officers from the Annual Survey of State and Local Government Employment
and Census of Governments, U.S. Census Bureau. The data for federal and state
employees are the actual numbers, however, as the local government statistics are based
on a sample of local governments. As in the UCR data, the numbers refer to October
of each year, but after 1997 the reference month was changed to March. As carried out
in the UCR data, I calculate the number of police officers by 100,000 inhabitants by
using the corrected population sizes provided by the dataset.
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3.A.2 Maps
Figure 3.9: Property Crime Rates - States - 2010
Data Source: UCR/FBI.
Figure 3.10: Violent Crime Rates - States - 2010
Data Source: UCR/FBI.
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Figure 3.11: Police Officers per 100,000 inhab. - States - 2010
Data Source: UCR/FBI.
Figure 3.12: Positive Variations in Police Officers (pc) above Average in the 1977 -
2010 period - States
Data Source: UCR/FBI.
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Figure 3.13: Real Income - Unskilled Workers - States - 2010
Data Source: CPS.




Figure 3.15: Police UCR vs Police ASG - US States - 1977 - 2010
Data Source: UCR/FBI/ASG.
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Table 3.9: Crime Equations - States - Workers Total Income
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Total Income -1.21*** -1.00** -1.16*** -0.86* -0.48* 0.34 -0.37 -0.50
(0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.41) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.29)
Constant -1.04** -0.05 -1.33** -1.13* -0.63* 0.74*** -0.70* -0.82*
(0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.53) (0.24) (0.20) (0.30) (0.39)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.70 0.78 0.63 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.36
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/CPS.
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Table 3.10: Crime Equations - States - Total Income - Asymmetric Effects
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Total Income (Negative ∆) -1.34*** -1.12*** -1.25*** -1.04* -0.52** 0.32 -0.38 -0.54
(0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.40) (0.19) (0.17) (0.21) (0.30)
Total Income (Positive ∆) -1.19*** -0.97** -1.15*** -0.84 -0.48* 0.36* -0.39 -0.48
(0.29) (0.32) (0.28) (0.42) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.30)
Positive ∆
Total Income =1 -0.33 -0.40 -0.19 -0.42* 0.00 -0.16 0.13 -0.19
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.19)
Constant -0.71 0.36 -1.15* -0.71 -0.65* 0.92** -0.86** -0.61
(0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.62) (0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.49)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R2 0.70 0.78 0.63 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.58 0.36
Positive ∆=Negative ∆ test 3.99 4.69 1.76 7.92 0.48 2.05 0.60 0.65
p-value 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.48 0.15 0.80 0.42
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/CPS.
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Table 3.11: Crime Equations - States - Total Income - Split Sample
Property Burglary Larceny MVT Violent Murder Assault Rape
Total Income (Negative ∆) -2.10*** -1.90*** -2.06*** -1.02*** -0.59*** 0.18** -0.66*** -0.23
(0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.19)
Constant -2.93*** -2.06*** -3.25*** -1.31*** -0.99*** 0.32*** -1.12*** -0.65*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.24) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19) (0.29)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 612 612 612 612 612 612 612 612
R2 0.698 0.781 0.608 0.206 0.323 0.462 0.262 0.322
Total Income (Positive ∆) -0.90*** -0.84*** -0.77*** -0.76*** -0.25*** 0.21*** -0.11 -0.47***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant -1.04*** -0.40** -1.16*** -1.07*** -0.67*** 0.31*** -0.67*** -1.09***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.18)
State Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088
R2 0.673 0.750 0.621 0.328 0.370 0.447 0.377 0.229
Positive ∆=Negative ∆ test 10.84 6.05 4.72 5.06 5.42 15.62 0.77 15.22
p-value 0.0035 0.0102 0.0300 0.0246 0.0200 0.0001 0.3811 0.0001
Notes: Standardised coefficients. Weighted by population in 2010. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
and clustering on state in parentheses. p-values for the test for unobserved state, time and two-way effects,
respectively: 0.0000 ; 0.0000; 0.0000 in all regressions.
Regressions controlled for the proportion of population between 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 years
old, Urbanization, Proportion of one-parent households and Unemployment rate.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Data Source: UCR/FBI/CPS.
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